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INTRODUCTION
The conventional story of the federal judiciary's institutional growth begins
with Marbury v. Madison and Chief Justice Marshall's establishment of judicial
review.' From there, it proceeds through the history of landmark Supreme
Court decisions that pushed back against the power of the political branches
and advanced the judiciary's institutional position.' In this familiar story, the
judiciary participates in the separation of powers through its case law.
Constitutional case law tells only part of the story, however.' In this Article,
I examine an additional and significant way in which federal judicial leaders4
influence the balance of governmental powers-through control over judicial
conduct regulation. Historically, federal judicial conduct regulation was limited
to the blunt constitutional tool of impeachment.' Today, after a half century of
reform, a complex regulatory regime addresses a broad range of judicial beha-
vior. This reform process facilitated judicial centralization, fostered a cohesive
judicial identity, and bolstered judicial autonomy. I argue that it empowered
the judiciary to play an increasingly influential role in the balance of govern-
mental powers.
Currently, conduct regulation arrangements are governed by the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges (the Federal Code of Conduct),' promulgated
by the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198o (the 1980 Act),7 enacted
by Congress. The Federal Code of Conduct prescribes appropriate conduct for
all federal judges. The 1980 Act authorizes any individual to file a complaint al-
leging that a judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and ex-
peditious administration of the business of the courts,"' but leaves it to the ju-
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See JUsTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS
OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (2012) (describing this "textbook account").
3. Id. at 4.
4. This includes Supreme Court Justices as well as appellate and district court judges
who were active in the judiciary's internal organizational structure.
5. See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152
F.R.D. 265, 277 (1994). Appeal and mandamus were available to review judges'
substantive decisions, but not their personal conduct. See Charles Gardner Geyh,
Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243' 287 (1993) [here-
inafter Geyh, Informal Methods]. And criminal proceedings were theoretically
available, but had never been brought against a sitting federal judge.
6. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (2009).
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diciary to interpret this language. The 1980 Act also authorizes the judiciary to
create a system for reviewing and processing complaints and for determining
appropriate sanctions.9
The judiciary has interpreted the statutory definition of misconduct"o to
encompass a broad range of problematic behaviors, spanning from gross mis-
conduct, such as bribery and corruption, to less egregious but still troubling be-
haviors, such as failure to file financial disclosure forms, attendance at privately
funded seminars, and membership in allegedly discriminatory organizations."
The judiciary has repeatedly clarified, however, that a violation of the Federal
Code of Conduct does not necessarily meet the statutory standard warranting
discipline." Explicitly excluded from the scope of coverage are failures to disqu-
alify or recuse, which are defined as merits-related and therefore outside of the
scope of the 1980 Act.'I
Legal ethics scholars have studied many aspects of this regime and offered
many proposals to regulate judicial conduct more effectively. 4 Unfortunately,
8. Id. § 3(a) (codified at 28 USC § 351(a) (2006)).
9. These sanctions include: censuring or reprimanding, either publicly or privately,
ordering that no new cases be assigned to the subject judge for a limited, fixed pe-
riod; requesting voluntary retirement; certifying disability of the judge; or, for the
most extreme misconduct, a recommendation of impeachment by the House of
Representatives. See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY
PROCEEDINGS R. 28 (Judicial Conference of the United States 20o8) [hereinafter
RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT].
10. 28 USC § 351(a).
11. See David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial
Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 911 (2009). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad
Judges, 83 TEx. L. REV. 431, 432-56 (2004) (describing the broad spectrum of judi-
cial misconduct).
12. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 85 F.3d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("[There is some indication that judicial councils should be guided in part
by the Canons in determining whether a [statutory] violation occurred."); RULES
FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 9, R. 3 cmt. (suggesting that the Code "may
be informative" on the meaning of § 351).
13. The judiciary's system of conduct regulation addresses judicial behaviors that are
not subject to appellate review because they fall outside the scope of substantive
decisionmaking. Recusal and disqualification standards, which are defined as me-
rits-related under the 1980 Act, address the related but distinct question of a
judge's ability to fairly engage in the substantive decisionmaking of a particular
case. See RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 9, R. 3(h)(3)(A). In this Ar-
ticle, I address only judicial behaviors that are governed by the conduct regulation
system and therefore do not discuss questions of recusal and disqualification.
14. Ethics scholars have focused narrowly on the desirability of specific standards of
conduct and modes of enforcement. See, e.g., Lara Bazelon, Putting the Mice in
Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be Trusted To Police
Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 Ky. L.J. 439, 439-42 (2009); Ar-
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thur D. Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes
and the Breyer Committee Report, 28 JUST. Sys. J. 426 (2007) [hereinafter Hellman,
Judges Judging Judges]; Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the
Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 210 (2007)
[hereinafter Hellman, The Regulation ofJudicial Ethics]; Ronald D. Rotunda, Judi-
cial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for
the Courts, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 301, 309 (2010); Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining
the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1233 (2000). To the extent these scholars
have addressed the broader significance of conduct regulation to the judiciary, it
has been with reference to the effects of existing or proposed regulations on judi-
cial legitimacy or on the decisional autonomy of individual judges. See, e.g., Baze-
Ion, supra, at 442-44; Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Original Sin and
Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1105, 11o8-o9 (2009); Rotunda, supra, at 325; Sankar, supra, at 1238-40.
Charles Geyh has taken a broader view, analyzing how the balance of power be-
tween branches of government affects judicial discipline and removal. But he has
not addressed the reverse relationship-how judicial discipline and removal affect
the balance of powers. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point on a
High Court: Some Thoughts on the Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice
Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial Self-Regulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041 (1995)
[hereinafter Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point]. Federal courts scholars have noted
the existence of disciplinary structures and their changes over time, but generally
have not viewed conduct regulation as a development worthy of sustained atten-
tion. See PETER G. FISH, POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1973);
CHARLES G. GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2008) [hereinafter GEYH, COLLIDE];
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997); ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (1988); Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1677 (2004); Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accounta-
bility, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the
Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003) [hereinafter Geyh, Constitutional Norms]; Charles
Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled
Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996); Judith Resnik, Constricting Reme-
dies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003)
[hereinafter Resnik, Constricting Remedies]; Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Ju-
diciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury-
Transforming the Meaning of Article Ill, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924, 933-34 (2000) [he-
reinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Jus-
tice": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District
of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEo. L.J. 607 (2002); Russell R. Wheeler & Robert
A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 1155 (2007). In a not-
able exception, Stephen Burbank has addressed the history and early years of the
1980 Act, analyzing the implicated interactions between Congress and the judi-
ciary. But his analysis is limited to this Act, and does not extend to the significance
of conduct regulation or to the judiciary's institutional development over time.
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982) [he-
reinafter Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking].
36
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they have largely neglected the broader political significance of federal judicial
conduct regulation. In this Article, I address the resulting gap in the literature. I
examine the rich historical record of interbranch negotiations regarding the
reform of judicial conduct regulation and analyze how the judiciary's role in
judicial conduct regulation has affected the separation of powers.
Two themes guide my analysis. First, regulating conduct is a much broader
endeavor than addressing misconduct.'I Judicial discipline historically sought to
deter and punish misconduct, but twentieth-century reforms aspired to condi-
tion appropriate behavior as well as to sanction misbehavior. The resulting sys-
tem of conduct regulation was highly influential in shaping the interactions and
identity of individual federal judges and the judiciary as a whole.'" Second, judi-
cial independence is properly understood as an ideal balance of autonomy and
accountability, along individual and institutional dimensions. On an individual
level, autonomy ensures that judges can decide cases free from improper out-
side influence while accountability ensures that they decide them in accordance
with law and their judicial role.'7 On an institutional level, autonomy insulates
the judiciary against improper pressure from the political branches while ac-
countability ensures that it is bound by our structure of government and the
rule of law.'"
These themes interact in important ways in the context of judicial conduct
regulation. When conduct regulation is conceptualized narrowly as compelling
some behaviors while deterring and punishing others, it mediates judicial inde-
pendence on an individual level. When it is conceptualized more broadly as
shaping judicial identity and power, it mediates independence on the institu-
tional level. Ideally, conduct regulation strikes a desirable balance of autonomy
and accountability on both levels. These themes provide an analytical frame-
work for understanding the historical development and political significance of
conduct regulation in the federal judiciary.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I address the early decades of
reform. I show that through the 196os and 1970s, with the support of the orga-
nized bar, judicial leaders used mounting public and congressional pressure for
reform to the judiciary's institutional advantage. Judicial leaders centralized
intrabranch authority within the Judicial Conference, began speaking on behalf
15. Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 123, 140 (2011).
16. In a previous article, I demonstrated that the organized bar used the reform
process in the states to encourage judicial involvement in the legal profession and
to foster close ties between bench and bar. Id. In the federal system, the reform
process proceeded along significantly different lines, with much less involvement
by the organized bar. But the resulting arrangements were no less influential in
conditioning judicial behavior.
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of all federal judges with a unified voice, and persuaded Congress to delegate
regulatory authority in the 1980 Act.
In Part II, I address the decades after the 198o Act. With formal self-
regulatory power consolidated within the Judicial Conference, judicial leaders
began using the issue of conduct regulation to forge a cohesive professional
identity. They decreased their reliance on the organized bar and fostered direct
interactions with Congress. Members of Congress threatened to intervene when
particular problems of judicial conduct provoked public scrutiny, but stepped
aside when the judiciary addressed the problems itself.
This historical pattern changed in the early 2000S when the Judicial Confe-
rence began asserting its autonomy more aggressively by signaling that it would
resist all congressional input regarding conduct regulation. Members of Con-
gress responded in an equally aggressive manner. They proposed interventionist
legislation to create an Office of the Inspector General for the judiciary with
sweeping powers to investigate and discipline individual judges and the branch
as a whole.
In Part III, I evaluate the resulting impasse between Congress and the judi-
ciary. I argue that neither institution's approach is an adequate response to the
current challenges of judicial conduct regulation. Congress's proposed legisla-
tion threatens to undermine judicial independence by holding the judiciary ac-
countable to the political preferences of Congress. The judiciary's defense of the
status quo threatens to undermine judicial legitimacy by failing to acknowledge
and address increasing public concern with complete self-regulation. To move
forward, I propose that the judiciary should reenlist the support of the orga-
nized bar and institute a more participatory and transparent conduct regulation
process. Through compromise, the judiciary can mollify Congress, protect its
independence, and preserve the separation of powers.
I. CRISIS OF CONDUCT
Prior to the 1960s, the federal judiciary was a highly decentralized institu-
tion with no formal system of conduct regulation. 9 Throughout the following
two decades, the Judicial Conference used the looming threat of congressional
interference to coalesce intrabranch support for reform. Initially, it relied on the
support of the organized bar. Subsequently, after convincing Congress to dele-
gate regulatory power through the 1980 Act, it pushed the bar away. In this Part,
I explain how the Judicial Conference used conduct regulation reform as a po-
litical opportunity to centralize judicial authority and to begin developing a
professionalized judicial identity.
19. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14, at 933-34.
38
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A. The Decentralized Judiciary
The early federal judiciary consisted of a loosely coordinated group of
largely autonomous and isolated judges.2 o Federal judges were scattered
throughout the country, had few interactions, and were subject to few con-
straints." Several believed that any form of conduct regulation short of im-
peachment represented an impermissible intrusion on judicial independence."
They lacked binding, uniform procedures and generally followed the proce-
dures of the states in which they sat."
Initial efforts at judicial centralization began in the early twentieth century,
but they did not reduce individual judges' nearly unlimited personal autono-
my.2 4 At the urging of Chief Justice Taft and in an effort to reduce delay and ex-
pense in litigation, Congress created the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in
1922.25 The Conference, which was to meet regularly to survey the business and
condition of the courts, was later renamed the Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States and given the additional charge of reporting annually to Congress.26
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Impact of the Code of Judicial Conduct on Federal
Judges, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 369, 372 (1972); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence ofJudi-
cial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 697-99 (1980).
23. Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14, at 934.
24. FISH, supra note 14, at 38-39.
25. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838-39 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)) (providing that the newly created Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges was to meet regularly with the Chief Justice and "sur-
vey... the condition of business" of the federal courts and make suggestions "in
the interest of uniformity and expedition of business").
26. 28 U.S.C. § 331; see Reviser's Notes, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE
28, UNITED STATES CODE, "JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE" at A I, A 45
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds. 1971) (explaining that intent "to au-
thorize the communication to Congress of information which now reaches that
body only because [it is] incorporated in the annual report of the Attorney Gen-
eral").
The Conference originally consisted of the Chief Justice as its presiding officer
and the chief judges of each circuit, known at the time as senior circuit judges.
ELMO HUNTER, THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND ITS COMMITTEE ON COURT AD-
MINISTRATION 4 (1986). In 1948, the Conference's name was changed to the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, and district judges were formally added to
the Judicial Conference in 1957. Anthony J. Scirica, The Judicial Conference of the
United States: Where Federal Court Policy Is Made, FED. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 28.
From its beginning as a small, ten-member Conference, the current Judicial Con-
ference has grown to include twenty-seven voting members: the Chief Justice, the
chief judge from each judicial circuit, the Chief Judge of the Court of Internation-
al Trade, and one district judge from each regional judicial circuit. Admin. Office
39
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Prior to 1980, the Judicial Conference had no binding authority over judges and
no formal role in judicial discipline."
In 1930, Congress took additional steps toward judicial centralization by es-
tablishing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the circuit
judicial councils, each composed of all of the judges in a single circuit." The
Administrative Office was created to assume responsibility for the judiciary's
administrative and financial affairs, which had previously been administered by
the Department of Justice. 9 The circuit judicial councils were created to ensure
the work of their member courts was being "effectively and expeditiously trans-
acted."3 o The Roosevelt Administration actively supported these steps, which it
viewed as promoting intrabranch accountability while also enhancing judicial
branch autonomy." Attorney General Homer S. Cummings explained that the
legislation was designed "so that [the judiciary] may not only be independent,
but that there may be a concentration of responsibility, so that if the business of
the judiciary gets behind ... they won't have someone else to blame for it."32
The legislation did not specifically address judicial conduct regulation and,
for most of the century, the judicial councils' authority to take corrective action
remained unclear.33 In 1965, the Tenth Circuit's judicial council responded to
misconduct by District Judge Stephen Chandler by temporarily suspending him
from all judicial duties.3 4 Judge Chandler, refusing to acknowledge the authority
of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference of the United States: Membership,
http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/JudicialConference/Membership.aspx (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012). And in recent years, a magistrate judge and a bankruptcy
judge have been invited by the Chief Justice to attend the Judicial Conference
meetings in a nonvoting, observer capacity. Dennis Cavanaugh, Magistrate Judges
Are Effective, Flexible Judiciary Resource, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 2008, at 7.
27. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2040 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2012)); see Judith
Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking
on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REv. 133, 172 n-131 (1997).
28. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, §§ 302, 3o6, 53 Stat. 1223,
1224 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 6oi (2012)).
29. FISH, supra note 14, at 125.
30. Administrative Office Act § 306. By investing appellate judges with responsibility
for branch administration, the judicial councils emphasized appellate judges' sta-
tus as distinct from, and superior to, district judges, promoting a hierarchical and
centralized judicial structure.
31. Geyh, Constitutional Norms, supra note 14, at 207-08.
32. Administrative Office of the United States Courts: Hearings on S. 3212 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 11 (1938) (statement of Homer S. Cummings,
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
33. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
34. Id. at 78 ("[Ulntil the further order of the Judicial Council, the Honorable Ste-
phen S. Chandler shall take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding now
40
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of the judicial council to impose such a sanction, filed a writ of mandamus and
prohibition with the Supreme Court. He argued that the council's action
represented an unconstitutional usurpation of Congress's power to impeach."
The Supreme Court sidestepped this core issue and concluded that because a
direct appeal remained open, Judge Chandler had failed to state a case for ex-
traordinary relief.36 Nevertheless, sharply divided dicta drew heightened atten-
tion to the issue. Expressing a sentiment shared by many federal judges, Justice
Douglas wrote: "It is time that an end be-put to these efforts of federal judges to
ride herd on other federal judges. This is a form of 'hazing' having no place un-
der the Constitution." 7 Accordingly, even as some judges advocated adminis-
trative centralization to increase the efficiency of the courts, many others main-
tained a traditional view of judges' individual autonomy. Under this view, once
judges ascended to the bench, they were free to espouse their views and to run
their courtrooms as they saw fit, subject only to the constitutional constraint of
impeachment.
The prevalence of this view impeded the development of more moderate
and forward-looking means of conduct regulation. Prior to 1973, federal courts
occasionally cited the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics-the American Bar Associ-
ation's first official statement of standards of appropriate judicial conduct-as
persuasive guidance regarding proper conduct."8 But federal courts declined to
adopt the Canons as definitive and binding standards. 9 Consequently, there
or hereafter pending in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma; that all cases and proceedings now assigned to or pending before
him shall be reassigned to and among the other judges of said court; and that until
the further order of the Judicial Council no cases or proceedings filed or instituted
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma shall be
assigned to him for any action whatsoever."). The problematic conduct included
conflicts of interest leading to multiple disqualifications, public accusations re-
garding the integrity of district and circuit judges, and personal involvement in a
number of civil and criminal lawsuits. Id. at 77.
35. Id. at 75-76, 82.
36. Id. at 86, 89.
37. Id. at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Contra id. at 85 (majority opinion) ("These are
reasonable, proper, and necessary rules, and the need for enforcement cannot rea-
sonably be doubted.. .. [I]f one judge in any system refuses to abide by such rea-
sonable procedures it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery of im-
peachment is the only recourse.").
38. Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code:
The Parting of the Ways, 28 JusT. SYsT. J. 271, 274 (2007).
39. As the Supreme Court explained in 1965, a provision of the Canons "ha[d] of itself
no binding effect on the courts but merely express[ed] the view of the [ABA]."
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); see, e.g., Natural Res., Inc. v. Wineberg, 349 F.2d
685, 691-92 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1965) (citing the Canons to underscore the importance
of judges' avoiding appearance of wrongdoing); United States v. Hintz, 193 F.
Supp. 325, 330 (D. Ill. 1961) (observing with approval that a judge's conduct con-
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was no consensus regarding appropriate standards of conduct for federal
judges. Combined with the strong and widespread belief that federal judges
were not properly subject to each other's supervision, this meant that peer pres-
sure, reputational concerns, and other informal channels of discipline were of
limited utility.40
Judges' resistance to the relinquishment of personal autonomy, even within
the branch, impeded administrative reform. The resulting decentralized model
of the judiciary also impeded the judiciary's ability to participate with a single
voice in interbranch discussions. The judiciary lacked shared notions of how
judges should behave, much less what policy positions the judiciary should take
before Congress. Consequently, although the Judicial Conference reported to
Congress on administrative matters, it appeared reluctant to assert itself on leg-
islative and policy matters.4 ' Burdened by collective action problems, the judi-
ciary possessed little institutional strength or political clout in interbranch rela-
tions.
B. Centralization Through Alliance with the Bar
In the second half of the century, high-profile instances of misconduct gave
rise to growing public and congressional criticism of the judiciary. 42 Some
judges responded by defending the status quo, 43 but a group of prominent judi-
cial leaderS44 approached the unrest from a different angle. They recognized
formed to the Canons); United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of S. Cal., 43 F.
Supp. 974, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (citing with approval Canon 19 but declining to
follow its requirement of informing litigants of the full grounds for decision);
Tolfree v. Wetzler, 22 F.2d 214, 230 (D.N.J. 1927) (citing the Canons but explaining
that their content needed elaboration).
40. Geyh, Informal Methods, supra note 5, at 244. But see Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 709 (1979) (noting that "[p]eer pressure is
a potent tool").
41. Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14, at 963-64.
42. See in CONG. REC. 27108 (1965) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings); Joseph Tyd-
ings, The Congress and the Courts: Helping the Judiciary To Help Itself 52 A.B.A. J.
321 (1966); John H. Holloman III, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis, and
Comment, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 128, 131-33 (1970).
43. See generally Frank J. Battisti, The Independence of the Federal Judiciary, 13 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 421 (1972) (describing past failed attempts at judicial over-
sight and discipline reform and current threats to judicial independence).
44. Throughout, I use "judicial leaders" to refer to members of the Judicial Confe-
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that with support from the organized bar, they could turn calls for reform into
useful political opportunities to bolster the judiciary's institutional strength.4 1
The threat of congressional action to increase judicial accountability
loomed large in the 1960s.46 In 1965, Senator Joseph D. Tydings announced that
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery would undertake a
comprehensive study of the federal courts.4 1 One of its objectives would be to
evaluate alternatives to impeachment for removing a federal judge found "unfit
by reason of physical or mental incapacity, inefficiency, or corruption."4' For
guidance, Senator Tydings and his committee looked to the spread of state judi-
cial conduct commissions-independent organizations with the power to im-
pose a range of sanctions on misbehaving judges, including the power to re-
move a judge in cases of extreme misconduct or lack of fitness.49 Citing states'
45. Cf Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 87, 90 (1996) (contending that "political actors produce political insti-
tutions in the process of seeking advantage in the conflict over substantive politi-
cal benefits").
46. Reform of judicial conduct arrangements in the states began much earlier than in
the federal system due to the successful efforts of the organized bar. State bar as-
sociations, working centrally through the ABA, had been actively promoting
adoption and enforcement of the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics since their prom-
ulgation. They had also been advocating for judicial conduct commissions. After
California established the first modern judicial conduct commission in 1960, see
Ballot Proposals for November 1960, THE COMMONWEALTH, Oct. 31, 1960, at 159-64,
other states rapidly followed its lead. See, e.g., Robert W. Galvin, Regulating Judi-
cial Misconduct in Massachusetts, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 189, 208-09 (1993). For his-
tories of the processes in various states noting the role of the bar, see James Alfini,
Shailey Gupta-Brietzke & James McMartin IV, Dealing with Judicial Misconduct in
the States: Judicial Independence, Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 889,
891-92, 908 (2007).
47. Ill CONG. REC. 27108 (1965) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings).
48. Id.
49. IRENE A. TESITOR & DWIGHT B. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 19-27
(2d ed. 1980). Reform of judicial conduct arrangements in the states began much
earlier than in the federal system due to the successful efforts of the organized bar.
State bar associations, working centrally through the ABA, had been actively pro-
moting adoption and enforcement of the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics since
their promulgation. They had also been advocating for judicial conduct commis-
sions. After California established the first modern judicial conduct commission
in 1960, see Ballot Proposals for November 1960, COMMONWEALTH, Oct. 31, 1960, at
159-64, other states rapidly followed its lead. See, e.g., Robert W. Galvin, Regulat-
ing Judicial Misconduct in Massachusetts, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 189, 208-09 (1993).
For histories of the processes in various states noting the role of the bar, see James
Alfini, Shailey Gupta-Brietzke & James McMartin IV, Dealing with Judicial Mis-
conduct in the States: Judicial Independence, Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX.
L. REV. 889, 891-92, 908 (2007).
43
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successful experiences with judicial conduct commissions, Senator Tydings
proposed similar arrangements for the federal system."o
In 1969, calls for the impeachment of Justice Fortas" and growing dissatis-
faction with the Warren Court moved the work of Senator Tydings's committee
into the spotlight" and changed the tenor of its hearings. As was described at
the time: "Gone were the expressions of confidence in and reverence for the
federal judiciary which had always carefully preceded the remarks of Senators
and testimony of witnesses in the past."" Replacing statements of respect for
the value of judicial independence were criticisms of "the Judiciary's failure to
keep its house in order," and observations regarding a "crisis of confidence, a
crisis that threatens to gravely impair its strength and its effectiveness."5 4 Sena-
tor Tydings explained his view that productive efforts at reform had been im-
peded by "[a]n exaggerated view of judicial independence."" He then intro-
duced the Judicial Reform Act,"6 which would provide for non-impeachment
removal and create a discipline review commission modeled on those in the
states." Illustrating a pattern that would repeat itself through the next thirty
50. 111 CONG. REC. 27108 (1965) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings).
51. The Nixon Administration began calling for the impeachment of Justice Fortas in
1969, allegedly because of reports that he had received a $20,000 consulting fee
from the family foundation of a former client who, at the time, was being investi-
gated for securities violations. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Judicial Ethics-The Fed-
eral Judiciary Seeks Modern Standards of Conduct, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 470,
470 (1970); see Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1968). Even though he returned the
initial payment and disclaimed the future payments, media reports sparked in-
tense public outrage, leading to his resignation. Justice Department Reported Stud-
ying Fortas-Wolfson Tie, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1969; Some in G.O.P. Ask Fortas to Re-
sign; No Democrats in Congress Express Support for Him in Wolfson Fee Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1969; see also Geyh, Constitutional Norms, supra note 14, at 216
(describing how "Fortas became a lightning rod for a backlash against the Warren
Court"); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impro-
priety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1926-28
(2010).
52. Holloman, supra note 42, at 135-36.
53. Id. at 137.
54. The Judicial Reform Act. Hearings on S. 1506 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.
16 (1969) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings).
55. Id. (blaming an "exaggerated view of judicial independence" as having deterred
"meaningful attempts to codify standards of judicial conduct or to require the
disclosure of extra-judicial activity and compensation").
56. Judicial Reform Act, S. 1506, 91st Cong. (1969).
57. Removal of Federal Judges, 56 A.B.A. J. 373, 374 (1970); see Holloman, supra note




THE INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONDUCT REGULATION
years of reform, Senator Tydings used the threat of legislation to pressure the
judiciary to act for itself, ensuring institutional accountability. He focused the
content of the proposed legislation on the conduct and misconduct of individu-
al judges, prompting the judiciary to respond by increasing the individual ac-
countability of its judges.
Sensitive to political dissatisfaction with the Warren Court and wary of
measures that could give Congress a heightened role in conduct regulation,
judicial leaders took the threat of legislation seriously. They recognized that
their best strategy for preventing congressional interference would be to per-
suade Congress and the public that the judiciary could handle matters itself; the
vast majority of judges were behaving well and the judiciary was already holding
accountable the few who were not. The problem was that taking such action
would require centralized and consolidated leadership that the judiciary lacked.
Judicial leaders had long been working to promote centralization" and had per-
suaded Congress to establish the Federal Judicial Center in 1967 to "engage[] in
the business of planning and thinking about the future and the overall plans
and problems in the judiciary."59 They had met with much less success within
the branch, however, as many judges clung to the traditional notion of absolute
autonomy.60
Judicial leaders were not to be dissuaded. In 1969, Chief Justice Warren"
convened a special session of the Judicial Conference to respond to both the
Fortas affair and Senator Tydings's proposed Judicial Reform Act." The meet-
ing produced four resolutions addressing judicial conduct, which were intended
to signal judicial leaders' willingness and ability to address problems from with-
58. James A. Gazell, ChiefJustice Warren's Neglected Accomplishments in Federal Judi-
cial Administration, 5 PEPP. L. REV. 437, 440-41 (1978); Russell Wheeler, Empirical
Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial
Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 44-45 (1988) (including an explanation by
Chief Justice Warren "that the 'time has urgently come when the Judicial Con-
ference needs to get its aims and goals before the Congress, the Executive, and the
general public and let them know what it is trying to accomplish to improve the
administration of justice in the country"' (quoting Minutes of Reed Committee
Meeting, Jan. 27, 1967, at 4)).
59. Wheeler, supra note 58, at 45 (quoting Interview with Chief Judge James Brown-
ing, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco (Oct. 5> 1977)).
6o. At the end of the decade, historian Peter Fish described the Judicial Conference's
"pervasive absence of power throughout the decade." FISH, supra note 14, at 283.
61. The Chief Justice serves as the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. 28
U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
62. Joint Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, A Review of the Activities of Judicial Conference Committees Con-
cerned with Ethical Standards in the Federal Judiciary, 1969-1976, 73 F.R.D. 247, 248
(1977).
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in the branch." If passed and acted upon, the resolutions would have: (i) re-
stricted extrajudicial compensation; (2) required regular financial disclosures;
and (3) established a committee to formulate an official code of conduct for the
federal judiciary.6 4 The proposed resolutions were popular with the media and
members of Congress 6 5 but distinctly unpopular with a majority of judges, who
continued to view new forms of conduct regulation as intrusions on their per-
sonal autonomy."1
The strong opposition of many judges posed a serious problem for Chief
Justice Warren and other leaders within the Judicial Conference. Having no
formal binding authority over members of the judiciary, the Judicial Confe-
rence relied on voluntary compliance by judges.7 If the Conference abandoned
the resolutions and took no action in the face of internal opposition, it would
invite immediate congressional interference. But if it forged ahead with the res-
olutions and judges failed to comply, it would publicly reveal its lack of intra-
branch authority. Either way, the judiciary would lose legitimacy and credibility
with both Congress and the public.
The American Bar Association (ABA) provided a route out of this predica-
ment. It, too, had acted quickly in response to the Fortas affair, appointing a
committee to review and update the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. As the
committee's chair, the ABA had named former California Chief Justice Roger
Traynor, a highly respected court reformer." When the Judicial Conference re-
convened in September 1969, newly appointed Chief Justice Burger reported
that Chief Justice Traynor had requested that the Judicial Conference suspend
action on its resolutions pending the ABA committee's completion of a revised
and updated code of conduct. Chief Justice Traynor suggested that "it w[ould]
63. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 42-43 (June lo, 1969).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Buttressing Judicial Integrity, WASH. PosT, June 13, 1969, at A26; John P.
MacKenzie, Federal Judges' Panel Bars Paid Outside Work, WASH. POST, June 11,
1969, at A8; see also Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Judicial Ethics: A Crisis Abates, 47
TUL. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1971) (describing "mostly favorable" responses by the
press to the June Resolutions).
66. Ainsworth, supra note 51, at 474.
67. The Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers and the Committee on the
Judiciary held hearings a month later that considered, among other things, "the
question of the authority of the Judicial Conference and judicial councils to adopt
and enforce rules and regulations governing the conduct and activities of federal
judges." Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 91st Cong. 5 (1969).
68. Ainsworth, supra note 51, at 474.
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be fortunate if both the federal and state judiciaries [could] eventually abide by
the same set of basic canons."6
Judicial leaders had long been trying to increase the federal judiciary's pres-
tige through distance from the practicing bar. 0 Accepting Chief Justice Tray-
nor's suggestion would empower the ABA and run counter to these efforts.' 1
But given its predicament, the Judicial Conference had little choice but to ac-
quiesce. By citing respect for the ABA's drafting process as the reason for tabling
its 1969 resolutions, the Judicial Conference could save face and preserve its
credibility. By demonstrating that it had the formal support of the organized
bar, the Judicial Conference could bolster its legitimacy. And by participating in
the ABA's drafting process, the Conference could, in a nonthreatening way,
break from its traditional approach of commenting on legislation only when
asked to do so and assume a more proactive stance in its interactions with Con-
gress.7' Accordingly, the Judicial Conference voted to suspend its June 1969 res-
olutions and to participate in the ABA's process of drafting a new code of judi-
cial conduct.'3
The Judicial Conference did not, however, surrender control over the de-
termination of appropriate standards of judicial conduct. Three federal judges
69. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 50-51 (June lo, 1969).
70. An ongoing theme of federal court reform had been strengthening judges' control
over the litigation process while reducing lawyers' control. See Peter G. Fish,
Guarding the Judicial Ramparts: John J. Parker and the Administration of Federal
Justice, 3 JUST. Sys. J. 105, 108 (1977). The sentiment that distance was needed was
expressed early in the court-reform process. See Charles E. Hughes, Some Needs of
the Bar, 30 CoM. L. LEAGUE J. 206, 206 (1925) (blaming widespread criticism of the
courts on the behavior of lawyers who "constantly foul our reputation by their
utterances and their acts").
71. For example, when the Federal Judicial Center was created, the Judicial Confe-
rence insisted that the governing board consist exclusively of judges, excluding
members of the legal profession because "professors ... and lawyers .. . each have
their specific and particular interest." Crisis in the Federal Courts: Hearings on the
Administration ofJustice in the Federal Court System and on S. 915 and H.R. 6111 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 309 (1967) (statement of C.J. Roszel C. Thomsen).
72. GEYH, COLLIDE, supra note 14, at 240-41.
73. Resolution II required judges to file a financial report with the Judicial Confe-
rence of "investments and other assets held by him at any time during the year as
well as a statement of income, including fits and bequests, from any source, iden-
tifying the source, and a statement of liabilities." REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 42-43 (June io, 1969). While
suspending this resolution, the Conference did approve the drafting and transmit-
tal of a reporting form for comments and also requested that federal judges report
back on "their views on the desirability of any financial reporting by federal
judges." Id.
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were members of the thirteen-member drafting committee, 74 and the commit-
tee seriously considered the Judicial Conference's proposals.75 The committee's
final draft was reviewed by the Judicial Conference's Joint Committee on the
Code of Judicial Conduct,'" composed exclusively of federal judges.? Accor-
dingly, when the Judicial Conference adopted the ABA's Model Code with only
minor changes in April 1973,78 it was adopting a written statement of standards
that aligned in most material respects with its preferences.7 9 The Conference
was also taking an important first step in demonstrating to the public that the
judiciary was willing and able to address judicial misconduct.
Ensuring enforcement of the new Code would mark the Conference's
second critical step in proving its ability to address problems from within. Crit-
ics claimed that standards of conduct meant little without a means of enforcing
them."o Finding themselves in a familiar predicament, judicial leaders recog-
nized the need for judicial action to avoid congressional interference but were
too weak to act in light of internal dissent and opposition. Again, they turned to
the ABA for political cover and support.
74. Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 375.
75. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 42-43(1973) (noting that in formulating the code, the ABA drafting committee had ac-
counted for proposed legislation in Congress and recent proposals and activity by
the Judicial Conference).
76. The 1969 resolution to establish a committee to formulate an official code of con-
duct for the federal judiciary had been tabled along with the other resolutions, in
light of Chief Justice Traynor's letter and the agreement to defer to the ABA draft-
ing process. However, anticipating the ABA's draft code, the Judicial Conference
established a joint committee, consisting of the members of the committee that
reviewed judges' disclosure forms and the committee that offered advisory opi-
nions, to review the ABA's code and "report[] back to the Judicial Conference on
the feasibility of adopting this report as applying to all federal judges and to de-
termine whether any additional standards may be needed in the federal system." A
Review of the Activities of Judicial Conference Committees Concerned with Ethical
Standards in the Federal Judiciary, 1969-1976, 73 F.R.D. 247, 252 (1977). This com-
mittee later became the Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct.
77. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 9-lo (Apr. 5-6, 1973).
78. Id. at 52-53. As adopted by the federal judiciary, the code became the "Code of
Conduct for United States Judges."
79. Ainsworth, supra note 65, at 257-58. The one principal change was a heightened
disqualification standard. While the governing federal statute required disqualifi-
cation when a judge had a "substantial" financial interest in a case, the relevant
code provision required disqualification when a judge had "any legal or equitable
interest, no matter how small." INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 6 (1970).
80. Holloman, supra note 42, at 137.
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The ABA had long been working in the states to create judicial conduct
commissions-independent committees authorized to investigate complaints,
file and prosecute charges, and recommend or impose sanctions, including re-
moval." The ABA had begun advocating similar arrangements in the federal
system, with the important caveat that all investigative and sanctioning power
would be invested exclusively in the federal judiciary rather than in an indepen-
dent body." The ABA was undeterred by constitutional challenges from mem-
bers of Congress" and by strong opposition from many individual judges.84
Even as some judges opposed any form of nonimpeachment removal pow-
er," the Judicial Conference recognized the advantages of aligning with the
ABA and the risks of defending the status quo. Most notably, the ABA could
lobby Congress with resources and political capital that the Judicial Conference
lacked. A new removal power invested in the judiciary was also far preferable to
new intrusive powers invested in Congress. Consequently, in 1969, the Judicial
Conference expressed support "in principle" for the ABA's removal legisla-
tion." The Judicial Conference maintained this position for the next decade,
voting tentative approval of a Senate bill that provided for a judicial conduct
commission and nonimpeachment removal in March 1978.87
C. Authority To Self-Regulate
As Congress continued to agitate for increased accountability in the late
1970s, the Judicial Conference continued to use the unrest strategically. The
81. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 49, at 19-27.
82. See Report of the Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure, and Compensa-
tion: Recommendations, 95 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 212, 213 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 ABA
Report].
83. See The Independence of Federal Judges: Hearings on S. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970); Sam J. Er-
vin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1o8, 121-27 (1970).
84. 1970 ABA Report, supra note 82, at 213.
85. Battisti, supra note 43, at 455 (criticizing the 1969 Judicial Reform Act and similar
attempts of congressional regulation as the "harassment of federal judges" that in-
fringes on judicial independence); see Association's House of Delegates Meets in At-
lanta, February 23-24, 56 A.B.A. J. 370, 374 (1970) (noting that the "Judicial Confe-
rence of the Ninth Circuit had considered" proposals for judicial removal and
"had overwhelmingly disapproved [of them]").
86. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 53 (Oct. 31 - Nov. 1 1969); see also 1970 ABA Report, supra note 82, at 147-48
(1970) (reporting longstanding Judicial Conference approval); Burbank, Proce-
dural Rulemaking, supra note 14, at 293 nn.32, 33.
87. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 6-7 (Mar. 9-10, 1978) (voting approval of S. 1423, 95th Cong. (1977)).
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Conference increased the judiciary's autonomy and, with the help of Congress,
decreased its reliance on the organized bar. Eventually, the Judicial Conference
gained sufficient confidence and authority to part ways with the bar, to change
its stated position, and to oppose all forms of nonimpeachment removal. In
doing so, the Judicial Conference revealed that its early alliance with the ABA,
while fruitful, had been a relationship of convenience.
Throughout this period, the threat of legislation continued to check the in-
stitutional autonomy of the judiciary, while proposed and actual legislation
continued to focus on increasing the individual accountability of judges. In
1978, responding to post-Watergate public mistrust in government," Congress
passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,'9 which required all federal offi-
cials to file annual personal financial reports of assets, income, gifts, and liabili-
ties.9 o
Initially, the Judicial Conference opposed application of the Act to the judi-
ciary on the grounds that it duplicated existing judicial disclosure guidelines
and was therefore unnecessary.9 ' Judicial leaders may have realized, however,
that the Act would prove useful in increasing intrabranch authority and inter-
branch autonomy. By granting the Judicial Conference formal authority to im-
plement and compel compliance with the Act's requirements,' the Act could
remedy the Judicial Conference's previous powerlessness to require judges to
follow disclosure procedures.93 By enabling the Judicial Conference to require
88. The Senate passed the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act, but the House
failed to act on it. See Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings
on S. 495 and S. 2o36 Before the S. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. (1975)
(noting that the Act would require federal judges along with other federal officials
to report publicly earned and unearned income together with gifts). In the next
Congress, the Public Officials Integrity Act, the precursor to the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act, was introduced. See Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts
and Other Conflict of Interest Matters: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 9 5th Cong. (1977).
89. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. App. 4 §§ 101-111 (2006)).
90. Id.
91. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 8-9 (Apr. 7, 1976) (disapproving of legislative proposals requiring financial
disclosure by federal judges due to overlap with the existing reporting and disclo-
sure procedures of the Judicial Conference).
92. Ethics in Government Act; see also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 19-23 (Mar. 7-9, 1979) ("We are required by
the statute to develop the necessary forms and promulgate such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary and ... monitor and investigate compliance with the
requirements of the judicial ethics statute.").
93. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 67-68 (Oct. 28-29, 1971). After suspending the June 1969 resolutions, the
Judicial Conference ultimately adopted a modified reporting resolution, requiring
so
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certain behaviors from federal judges, the Act could lay the groundwork for a
more cohesive institutional culture. 4 The Act also provided a useful precedent
of direct interactions with Congress in place of intermediation by the organized
bar, lobbying on the judiciary's behalf.
After the Act passed the Senate, and concurrently with its passage in the
House, the Judicial Conference rebuked the ABA's position and reversed its po-
sition on removal legislation. With an imminent increase in authority bolster-
ing its confidence, the Conference apparently saw little need to continue its al-
liance with the organized bar. With little discussion, the Judicial Conference
announced that its previous support had been "widely misunderstood" and cla-
rified its "disapproval of any legislative provision which purports to delegate to
any other tribunal or entity the constitutional power of Congress to remove a
federal judge from office."95
Six months later, the Judicial Conference passed a series of resolutions that
demonstrated new resolve to speak with a single voice on behalf of the judi-
ciary.9* Whereas the Judicial Conference had previously played a relatively pas-
sive and reactive role in its relations with Congress,97 it now took a more proac-
tive stance. It approved "principles to be reflected in any [judicial conduct]
legislation," which included a commitment to impeachment as the only means
judges to report outside compensation exceeding sioo per quarter and organiza-
tional positions held. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFE-
RENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1969). This was then included in
the Federal Code of Conduct. Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, 69
F.R.D. 273, 284-85 (1975) (reprinting the Code of Judicial Conduct for United
States Judges as approved by the Judicial Conference). But the Conference had no
authority to compel compliance and, prior the passage of the statute, faced the
problem of noncompliant judges. See Judge Edward A. Tamm: The Role of the
Committee on Judicial Ethics, THIRD BRANCH, July 1984, at 1, 5.
94. Even with the new delegation of authority, the Conference continued to struggle
with certain judges who refused to file on principle. The chairman of the commit-
tee that received the reports later described receiving "thirty to fifty vitriolic letters
a year" from objecting judges. Judge Edward A. Tamm: The Role of the Committee
on Judicial Ethics, supra note 93, at 5.
95. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 50 (Sept. 21-22, 1978); see also Patrick Donald McCalla, Judicial Disciplining
of Federal Judges Is Constitutional, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1263, 1271 (1989) (explaining
that the Judicial Conference reversed its earlier approval and definitively ex-
pressed opposition to the removal legislation).
96. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 5, 6-8 (Mar. 7-9, 1979); Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking, supra note 14, at
296-97.
97. Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 14, at 282 (revealing that, historically, the
Judicial Conference self-consciously refrained from asserting itself on policy mat-
ters).
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of removal.9' It resolved that "all previous Judicial Conference resolutions or
comments upon legislation dealing with the conduct of federal judges [shall be]
superseded."99 Finally, it drafted a bill to implement new forms of conduct reg-
ulation within the existing structures of the judiciary.' The bill gave chief cir-
cuit judges and circuit judicial councils primary responsibility for reviewing
misconduct complaints and ordering sanctions, while granting the Judicial
Conference a limited appellate role and reserving for Congress a loose oversight
role. "o
Many Members of Congress recognized advantages to supporting the Judi-
cial Conference's bill and delegating the day-to-day work of conduct regulation
to the Judicial Conference.o 2 By doing so, Congress could quiet internal critics
who had been protesting removal legislation as an unconstitutional encroach-
ment on judicial authority.o3 Congress could preserve resources for other
priorities while demonstrating seriousness about conduct reform.'0 4 And it
could demonstrate respect for the expertise of the Judicial Conference and the
values of judicial independence and accountability. Based on the Judicial Con-
ference's proposal, Congress enacted the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (the 1980 Act).'0 Through the 1980 Act,
Congress loosely defined misconduct as "conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."'0 Congress dele-
gated to the judiciary authority to determine what conduct violates this stan-
dard, as well as to formulate and implement procedures to process complaints
and impose sanctions.'0 7
98. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 (Mar. 7-9, 1979).
99. Id. at 6.
1oo. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2012)); see Bur-
bank, Procedural Rulemaking, supra note 14, at 284-85.
101. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.
102. Ervin, supra note 83, at 121-27.
103. FISH, supra note 14, at 301-05.
104. See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 252-54
(1988).
105. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.
106. Id. § 3(a) (c) (1).
107. See 28 USC § 358 (2012). The Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability
Proceedings (the Rules) establish the standards and procedures for addressing
complaints brought under the Act of 1980. These Rules provide that once a com-
plaint has been filed or identified, the chief judge of the circuit must review the
complaint and determine whether it should be: (i) dismissed, (2) referred to a
special committee for investigation, or (3) concluded due to voluntary corrective
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In persuading Congress to accept its proposal for formal self-regulatory
power, the Judicial Conference took a significant step towards its goal of conso-
lidating intrabranch authority. In subsequently implementing the Act's provi-
sions, the Judicial Conference began working towards the additional goal of fos-
tering a unifying judicial culture. To this end, the Conference began developing
a complaint processing system that promoted discretion as the hallmark of
conduct regulation as well as of the judiciary's professional identity. For exam-
ple, shortly after enactment, the Judicial Conference addressed the question of
whether an individual could file a misconduct complaint under the 1980 Act al-
leging a judge's failure to file financial disclosure forms."as Emphasizing the crit-
ical importance of judicial discretion, the Judicial Conference decided a formal
complaint was an inappropriate means of addressing the problem and that chief
action or intervening events that make action on the complaint unnecessary.
RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 9, R. u. The chief judge may conduct a
limited inquiry at this stage but must not make determinations on any reasonably
disputed issue. Id. at 13. For complaints that are dismissed or concluded, the chief
judge must provide a memorandum in support of the disposition. Id. at 14. If the
complaint is not concluded or dismissed, the chief judge must appoint a special
committee, consisting of the chief judge and an equal number of circuit and dis-
trict judges, to investigate the allegations. Id. at 19. The special committee must
submit a comprehensive report of its investigation to the judicial council of the
circuit, including findings and recommendations for council action. Id. at 24. Af-
ter considering the special committee's report, the judicial council may, at its dis-
cretion and by majority vote: (1) dismiss or conclude the complaint; (2) refer the
complaint to the Judicial Conference; (3) request the special committee to con-
duct further investigation or investigate the matter itself; or, (4) take remedial ac-
tion to ensure the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts. Id. at 27-29. Both the complainant and the subject judge may petition the
judicial council to review the chief judge's disposition. Id. at 26. The judicial
council may affirm the chief judge's disposition by denying the petition; return
the matter to the chief judge for further investigation or with directions to ap-
point a special committee; or, in exceptional circumstances, take other appropri-
ate action. Id. at 30. Upon petition by the complainant or subject judge, or by its
own initiative, the Judicial Conference's Committee on Judicial Conduct and Dis-
ability may review certain judicial council orders. Id. at 31. The Committee's dis-
positions of petitions for review are ordinarily final, unless the Judicial Confe-
rence, at its discretion, exercises its power of review. Id. Lastly, if the Judicial
Conference determines impeachment may be warranted, it must transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives the record of all relevant proceedings. Id.
at 33.
1o8. The Judicial Conference's Committee on Judicial Ethics had learned of two judges
and one magistrate judge who were continuing to refuse to comply with disclo-
sure requirements. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 78 (Sept. 24-25, 1981).
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judges should address failures to file financial disclosures within their respective
circuits as they saw fit.o 9
The Judicial Conference's ability to make this decision, which balanced au-
tonomy from outside interference with limited accountability within, demon-
strated that the judiciary had entered a new phase of institutional growth. It had
pushed aside the traditional model of the judiciary as a decentralized institution
comprising autonomous judges. It had increased the accountability of individu-
al judges and, in doing so, had convinced Congress to acquiesce in limited insti-
tutional accountability. And it had begun formulating its own positions rather
than following those of the organized bar. Initially, the ABA had helped the
Judicial Conference emerge as a serious political actor in the eyes of Congress
and the public, but the Judicial Conference was now ready for increased dis-
tance from the organized bar.
II. JUDICIAL IDENTITY AND GROWING AUTONOMY
After the passage of the 1980 Act, judicial leaders continued to use conduct
regulation to the judiciary's institutional advantage: to establish distance from
the organized bar, to develop a distinct and cohesive judicial identity, and to
speak with a unified voice in interbranch relations. Congress remained content
to acquiesce in self-regulation as long as the Judicial Conference was attentive
to congressional and public concerns. This pattern continued until the early
2000S, when the Judicial Conference began rejecting all outside suggestions for
conduct regulation. Congress responded by seeking a more direct and intrusive
role in conduct regulation. In this Part, I detail the process through which the
Judicial Conference reached an apex of confidence in its institutional position
and triggered a fundamental change in approach by Congress.
A. Fracture with the Bar
Historically, the federal judiciary viewed distance from the practicing bar as
a desirable means of bolstering judicial efficacy and prestige."o In the years fol-
109. Id. ("It was the view of the Conference that it would be inappropriate for the
Committee to make use of the formal procedures of the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act. The Committee, however, was authorized, as one of its enforce-
ment procedures, to make reports concerning judges who may appear to the
Committee to be acting in violation of the Ethics in Government Act to the ap-
propriate chief circuit judges.").
11o. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of the
Israeli Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 783 (2001) ("With the peaking of its
moral authority and social reputation, the judiciary began to perceive a close rela-
tionship with the Bar as not only in vain but even harmful."); cf Paul D. Carring-
ton, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 93 (1988) (noting that William H. Taft "ardently
favored the professionalization of the judiciary").
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lowing passage of the 1980 Act, the judiciary worked to increase that distance by
establishing itself as a distinct profession, separate from the legal profession."'
The judiciary's stance presented a contrast to the situation in many states,
where the organized bar was using the reform of judicial conduct regulation to
increase the number and closeness of ties between bench and bar."'
One of the principal mechanisms through which the federal judiciary
sought to distance itself from the bar was code drafting. In 1969, to review the
code proposed by the Traynor Commission, the Judicial Conference had
created the Joint Committee on Code of Conduct (now the Committee on
Codes of Conduct)."' After the Judicial Conference adopted the first Federal
Code of Conduct in 1972, this committee was tasked with periodically reviewing
and amending the Code, which it began doing in a way that gradually distin-
guished its process and code from the ABA's process and code."I In 1981, for ex-
ample, the Joint Committee proposed and the Judicial Conference adopted new
commentary that disapproved of judicial membership in discriminatory organ-
izations."5 At the time, the ABA was considering amendments to the ABA Mod-
el Code's analogous provisions, but the Judicial Conference did not wait for
ABA comments before adopting the new canon. The substance of the new pro-
vision likely also reflected the Judicial Conference's quest for independence.
The canon vested discretion in individual judges to determine which organiza-
tions qualified as discriminatory, reinforcing discretion as a central and distin-
guishing feature of the judiciary's identity. Whereas the ABA's provision man-
dated that a judge "shall" not hold membership in a discriminatory
organization, the Federal Code provided that a judge "should" not, explaining
in commentary that individual judges must "determine[] by [] conscience...
il. The judiciary faced significant obstacles in doing so. Typically, professionalization
entails an occupational group seeking economic and social benefits by "closling]
access to the occupation, to its knowledge, to its education, training and creden-
tials and to its markets in services." KEITH M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
THE PROFESSIONS 29 (1995). Here, although the Judiciary was no longer reliant on
the bar's support for authority in conduct regulation, it continued to share many
close ties with the bar. Cf Rosen-Zvi, supra note no, at 784 ("The professional
project of the judiciary ... is the project of a sub-profession struggling to disso-
ciate itself from the rest of the profession. . .. The problem for the judiciary is not
so much gaining an image of professionals in the public, but distinguishing itself
from a very similar group from which, to a large extent, it originated, and with
whom it shares the same formal training and a similar body of knowledge.").
Among other things, being a lawyer had long been a prerequisite to becoming a
federal judge. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER
JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1986).
112. See generally Remus, supra note 15 (describing the reform process in the states).
113. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 38, at 278.
114. Id.
115. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 27 (Mar. 12-13, 1981).
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whether membership in a particular organization is compatible with the duties
of judicial office.""'
The Judicial Conference's efforts to distinguish itself from the bar received
indirect but critical support when Congress preempted certain provisions of the
ABA Model Code through the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (1989 Ethics Act)." 7
The 1989 Ethics Act, which amended the 1978 Ethics Act, restricted outside
earned income, honoraria, and gifts for all federal officials."' The Act invested
in each branch the authority to adopt binding regulations to implement the
new restrictions," 9 granting the Judicial Conference implementing authority
not only over all lower court judges, but also over Justices of the Supreme Court
and members of the Federal Judicial Center-two entities over which the Con-
ference had previously lacked jurisdiction. 2 o Soon after the Act's passage, the
Judicial Conference amended the Federal Code to conform to the new statutory
disclosure and gift provisions."'
Through the 1990s, the Judicial Conference's drafting process continued to
diverge from the ABA's. After the ABA revised the Model Code in 1990, the
Judicial Conference announced that its Committee on Codes of Conduct would
review the new Model Code "to determine whether the Judicial Conference
should adopt the substantive changes and, if so, how to do so appropriately for
the federal judicial system."' The ABA's central changes were to state most
standards in mandatory rather than advisory terms' and to relegate additional
aspirational guidance to the commentary.2 4 The ABA advocated that the federal
as well as state judiciaries adopt this approach to signal a commitment to-and
116. Id. (quoting Model Codes of Conduct for Various Judicial Employees Canon 2 cmt.).
117. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C.A § 7353 (2012)); see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ETHICS
LAW REFORM, To SERVE WITH HONOR: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT (1989) (recommending a wide array of ethical regulations for all three
branches of government).
118. Ethics Reform Act.
19. Id.
120. Id.
121. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 14, 15 (Mar. 13, 1990).
122. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 68 (Sept. 12, 1990).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, House
Approves Judicial Code, 76 A.B.A. J. 130 (Oct. 1990) (describing the replacement of
"should" in the old code with "shall" as one of the changes to the 1990 Code).
124. 1151 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 759 (1990) (distinguishing mandatory standards from aspi-
rational guidelines in the newly adopted 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct).
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in practice to compel-enforcement of the standards of judicial conduct."'
Likely because this change would run counter to the Judicial Conference's ef-
forts to cultivate discretion as the mark of judicial professionalism, it declined
to adopt the change for the Federal Code without comment."'
The ABA's declining influence in the federal system was evident elsewhere
as well-namely, in its implementation and enforcement efforts. In the wake of
three time-consuming impeachments between 1986 and 1989,127 Congress ex-
pressed renewed interest in the implementation and functioning of the 1980
Act. 128 In 1990, Congress created the National Commission on Judicial Discip-
line and Removal to review complaint-processing procedures and to reconsider
non-impeachment removal as an additional sanction."'9 The ABA's president
requested a formal role, but when he was invited to testify before the congres-
sional commission, he appeared disorganized and unprepared to offer mea-
ningful federal proposals."o His testimony sparked significant internal disa-
greement within the ABA over the desirability of federal removal legislation and
other new enforcement mechanisms."' The ABA's focus on the states had ap-
125. M. Peter Moser, The 1990 ABA Code ofjudicial Conduct: A Model for the Future, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 731, 731-32, 734 (explaining the changes and advocating
adoption by federal and state judiciaries).
126. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 62 (Sept. 22, 1992).
127. Between 1986 and 1989, three federal judges were impeached: Judge Claiborne,
Judge Hastings, and Judge Nixon. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics, su-
pra note 14, at 209.
128. In 1989, several bills and constitutional amendments relating to judicial removal
were pending, including H.R. 1620, H.R. 1930, H.R. 2181, and S.J. Res. 11, 232, and
233.
129. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal was established by
the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 409, 410, 104 Stat.
5o89, 5124-27.
130. When ABA president Talbot D'Alemberte testified before the Commission that
the ABA continued to support removal legislation, he conceded that the ABA
would need more time to develop a formal proposal for implementation within
the federal judiciary. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline
and Removal, 6, 147-48 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 National Commission Report]; see
also 118 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 618, 622 (1993) (reporting ABA President D'Alemberte's
testimony to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal on the
ABA's policy favoring "non-impeachment judicial removal ... to which... the
Association saw no constitutional impediment"). When pushed, D'Alemberte
suggested that the Commission simply examine the ABA Standards Relating to
Judicial Discipline, Disability and Retirement, even though they had been drafted
chiefly with a view to the states. 1993 National Commission Report, supra.
131. Report of the Task Force on Judicial Removal et al.: Recommendation, 118 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 618, 623 (1993) (formally reversing position and explaining that "prior reso-
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parently left it unprepared to participate with a unified voice in the federal sys-
tem.
By the close of the commission's proceedings, the Judicial Conference had
satisfied Congress that it was adequately addressing judicial conduct matters.
The commission reported favorably on implementation of the 1980 Act and
reaffirmed impeachment as the sole constitutional method of removal."2 The
commission also supported an amendment to the 1980 Act that would further
empower the Judicial Conference by authorizing it to certify conduct warrant-
ing impeachment to the House, independent of any certification from a circuit
judicial council. 13 In approving this amendment,3 4 Congress reaffirmed broad-
based judicial self-regulation while also reinforcing the Judicial Conference's
success in using conduct reform strategically-first to acquire authority over
the conduct of individual judges, and then to strengthen interbranch institu-
tional autonomy by increasing intrabranch individual accountability.
B. ExtremeAutonomy
In the early 2000S, the Judicial Conference expressed new confidence in its
authority and autonomy. Having successfully distanced itself from the orga-
nized bar in matters of judicial conduct regulation, it began resisting congres-
sional involvement as well. One issue in particular-judicial attendance at pri-
vately funded educational seminars-revealed the Judicial Conference's
increasingly insular and assertive approach, and introduced new and significant
tension in interactions between the Judicial Conference and Congress. 35
In a 1980 advisory opinion, the Judicial Conference had condoned atten-
dance at private seminars subject to the overriding requirement that judges
avoid the appearance of impropriety.136 Judges viewed the opinion as approving
lutions of the ABA House of Delegates do not fairly reflect the delicate balance of
the arguments on this obviously difficult and important constitutional question").
132. The Commission's "report basically endorsed existing constitutional arrange-
ments in all respects and concluded that the judiciary had, on the whole, utilized
the 1980 Act properly and policed itself fairly." REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (Sept. 20, 1993).
133. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152 F.R.D.
265, 397 (1994).
134. In 2002, as part of an appropriations act, Congress passed a revised version of the
1980 Act, which made only minor changes in procedural details and codified the
Act in its own chapter of the U.S. Code. 21st Century Department of Justice Ap-
propriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1848-56 (2002).
135. Fred Barbash, Big Corporations Bankroll Seminars for U.S. Judges, WASH. PosT,
Jan. 20, 1980, at Ai.
136. Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Attendance at Educational Seminars, Ad-
visory Op. No. 67 (1980) (stating that seminar participation was allowable so long
as it was consistent with canons relating to avoiding appearances of impropriety),
see United States Judicial Conference, Administrative Office and Federal Judicial
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attendance at virtually any seminar, including seminars that entailed all-
expenses-paid trips to attractive destinations, funded by corporate sponsors or
ideological interest groups.3 7 Problematic appearances fueled public and con-
gressional criticism throughout the 199os,'s leading to calls for legislative ac-
tion."9
In 2000, Senators John Kerry and Russell Feingold introduced a bill to re-
quire the Federal Judicial Center to vet seminars in advance to determine
whether attendance would undermine "the public's confidence in an unbiased
and fair-minded judiciary."' 4o Given that the vetting was to occur within the ju-
diciary, the legislation would have neither intruded on judicial autonomy nor
shifted the interbranch balance of powers. It would only have increased the in-
dividual accountability of judges for their decisions to attend private seminars.
Nevertheless, the Judicial Conference and the Federal Judicial Center strongly
opposed the bill.14' Judicial leaders predicted that limiting the education of
judges would have "unintended consequences."' They expressed concerns
with Congress's proposed interference in the judiciary's affairs and argued that
Center and the "Protecting American Small Business Trade Act of 1998": Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 78
(1998) (statement of J. Terrell Hodges, Chairman, Executive Commission of the
Judicial Conference of the United States) ("It is a very difficult problem or issue
that each judge has to decide ultimately for himself or herself when invited to at-
tend a seminar that is being sponsored by someone other than a governmental
entity.... [I]t has been dealt with, at least to some extent, by opinions of the
Conduct Committee .... .")
137. Cf Congress Looks at Creating Judicial Watchdog, National Public Radio, July 24,
2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5577532 (interview-
ing Professor Stephen Gillers on the differences between how judges view atten-
dance at seminars and how the public views such attendance).
138. Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars for Judges, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1998,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/april98/judges9.htm; Let
Judges Spurn Bogus Seminars and Pay for Their Own Vacations, FT. LAUDERDALE
SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 1998, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1998-o4-18/news
/9804170454_1 seminars-federal-judges-judicial-advisory-committee.
139. The Senate passed a nonbinding resolution urging the judiciary to "review and
reevaluate" its rules regarding gifts, travel, and travel-related expenses. S. Res. 158,
104th Cong. § 3 (1995) (enacted) ("It is the sense of the Senate that the Judicial
Conference of the United States should review and reevaluate its regulations per-
taining to the acceptance of gifts and the acceptance of travel and travel-related
expenses and that such regulations should cover all judicial branch employees, in-
cluding members and employees of the Supreme Court of the United States.").
140. Judicial Education Reform Act, S. 2990, 1o6th Cong. (2000).
141. Judicial Conference Opposes Sweeping Restrictions on Educational Programs, THIRD




YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
judges deserved an opportunity to address the issue themselves.143 Apparently
willing to give the judiciary a second chance, Senators Kerry and Feingold
dropped the bill.
The ABA, meanwhile, saw an opportunity to reassert itself on the federal
scene. In contrast to the more relaxed seminar policies it was advancing in the
states,144 the ABA drafted an ethics opinion that would prohibit attendance by
federal judges at virtually all private seminars.'14 The opinion drew the judi-
ciary's ire. In a harshly worded letter, the director of the Administrative Office
accused the ABA drafting committee of acting under the inappropriate influ-
ence of ideological interest groups.' " Other judicial leaders chimed in with ad-
ditional criticisms of the ABA's approach, noting the absence of judges on the
ABA's drafting committee, the committee's reluctance to release its draft for
federal judicial review and commentary, 4 7 and the allegedly insufficient weight
accorded to the value of continuing judicial education. 4 Chastened, the ABA
retreated from the debate without issuing the opinion.
The seminar controversy demonstrated a worrying decline in the quality of
the judiciary's institutional relations with both Congress and the legal profes-
sion. The Judicial Conference appeared unresponsive to calls for the introduc-
tion of relatively moderate accountability measures, which were aimed at in-
creasing judicial legitimacy and improving the quality of judicial conduct
regulation. Apart from their genesis in Congress and the ABA, the proposals did
not threaten to erode judicial autonomy from Congress or from the bar. To the
contrary, they had the potential to improve public confidence while preempting
further threats from the political branches. But instead of studying and carefully
considering the proposals, the Judicial Conference quickly rejected them.
143. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 38 (Sept. 2000) (opposing pending legislation limiting seminar attendance
and requesting an opportunity to "study and comment upon those issues and to
take such action as is necessary and appropriate").
144. LISA MILFORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 30-44 (1992) (de-
scribing the drafting and adoption of Canon 4).
145. Tony Mauro, Judges Assail ABA Study on Paid Trips, LEGAL TIMES, June 24, 2002,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005372812&JudgesAssail
_ABAStudy-onPaidTrips.
146. Tainted Justice: How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public Trust in the Federal
Judiciary, COMMUNITY RIGHTS COUNSEL ch. 2, at 8 (Mar. 2004),
http://communityrights.org/Taintedjustice/Introduction.pdf.
147. Mauro, supra note 145.
148. Judicial Education Reform Act, S. 2990, io6th Cong. § 1 (2000); see also Chief Jus-
tice Supports Judges' Education, THIRD BRANCH, June 2001, at 1, 6 (reporting Chief
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C. Congress's Response
After passing the 1980 Act into law, Congress proved willing to acquiesce in
judicial self-regulation. But four years after the seminar controversy, in light of
the Judicial Conference's continued failure to adopt a new seminar policy,
members of Congress adopted a new approach that would fundamentally un-
dermine judicial self-regulation.14 9 No longer focusing narrowly on the accoun-
tability of judges as individuals, they sought to hold the judiciary accountable as
an institution.
Signaling this new approach, House Judiciary Committee Chairman James
Sensenbrenner told the Judicial Conference at its March 2004 meeting that
Congress "will begin assessing whether the disciplinary authority delegated to
the judiciary has been responsibly exercised and ought to continue."o5 o Mem-
bers of the Senate introduced new bills to set standards regarding private semi-
nars and conflicts of interest without input from the Judicial Conference.'
The judiciary's institutional position, which recently appeared strong and
fortified, was now on more tenuous ground. Recognizing this, the Judicial Con-
ference retreated from its aggressive stance. Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed a
committee in May 2004, chaired by Justice Breyer (the Breyer Commission), to
study the judiciary's implementation of the 1980 Act. 52 It was too late, however,
to mollify Judiciary Committee leaders and other members of Congress. Sena-
tor Charles Grassley introduced the Judicial Transparency and Ethics En-
hancement Act of 20o6, which sought to establish an Office of Inspector Gener-
al of the judiciary. '5 He argued that the Act would be "just the right medicine
149. See 152 CONG. REC. S229 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
("For the past 4 years, editorial boards across the country have called our atten-
tion to the appearance of impropriety that occurs when federal judges accept gifts
and attend lavish private seminars sponsored by well-heeled corporations .... I
had hoped that the federal judiciary would engage in self-regulation on these
timely and substantive ethical issues. Unfortunately, press reports show continued
appearances of impropriety. . . .").
150. Remarks of House Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner Before the U.S.
Judicial Conference, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 280, 281 (2004).
151. Fair and Independent Federal Judiciary Act of 2003, S. 787, io8th Cong. § 7 (2003);
Federal Judicial Salary Restoration Act of 20o8, S. 1638, noth Cong. § io(c) (20o8).
152. Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, THE JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, at 1 (Sept. 20o6),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/breyero6.pdf/$fde/breyero6.pdf [here-
inafter BREYER REPORT]; Hellman, The Regulation ofJudicial Ethics, supra note 14,
at 210.
153. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 20o6, H.R. 5219, lo9th
Cong. (20o6). This Act, sponsored by Representative James Sensenbrenner in
20o6, 2007, 2009, and 2011, would have established an Office of Inspector General
for the judicial branch.
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the federal judiciary needs to ensure it is complying with its own ethical guide-
lines and to root out potential waste, fraud and abuse in the system."'M
The bill would grant Congress extensive influence over many aspects of the
judiciary's functioning and system of self-regulation. Its provisions granted
Congress a role in appointing the Inspector General and required the Inspector
General to report back to Congress annually."' The provisions required the In-
spector General to conduct investigations of alleged judicial misconduct, to
recommend oversight or other action by Congress, to conduct and supervise
audits, and to recommend new or amended legislation governing the judicial
branch."' Additional provisions authorized the Inspector General to subpoena
judicial testimony and records including "all information kept in the course of
business by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the judicial councils of
circuits, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and the United
States Sentencing Commission."'
If enacted, the legislation would grant Congress significant influence over
judicial conduct regulation. It would also empower members of Congress to
target individual judges for their substantive decisions. The bill's supporters de-
nied this charge, noting that the bill prohibited the Inspector General from in-
vestigating or reviewing the merits of a judicial decision."' But nothing would
prevent members of Congress from using their influence over the Inspector
General's far-reaching investigatory powers to retaliate against judges for par-
ticular decisions.
The potential dangers of the legislation are underlined by the activities of its
sponsors, including its principal sponsor, Representative Sensenbrenner. In re-
sponse to substantive judicial decisions," 9 Sensenbrenner has threatened im-
peachment proceedings, held oversight hearings, and subpoenaed judges'
records.' In the past, others in Congress have similarly used threats of im-
peachment to retaliate against judges for particular substantive rulings.16 1 These
154. House Bill Would Impose Inspector General on Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, July
20o6, at 2.
155. H.R. 5219 § 1025.
156. Id. § 1023.
157. Id. § 1o24.
158. See The Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2oo6: Hearing on
H.R. 5219 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 40 (2006) (statement
of Arthur D. Hellman, quoting Rep. James Sensebrenner).
159. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 13-19 (2004) (describing the investigation of Judge Rosenbaum by the
House Judiciary Committee, of which Rep. Sensebrenner was a member and then
the chair).
160. Id.
161. High profile examples include calls for the impeachment of Justices Fortas, War-
ren, Douglas, and, most recently, Kennedy (in the wake of Romer v. Evans, 513
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partisan efforts remained squarely outside the formal system of judicial conduct
regulation, however, and never posed credible threats.16 2 That could change un-
der the proposed legislation, which effectively authorizes the Inspector General
to define "conduct" broadly enough to include the substantive work of judging.
The Judicial Conference acted quickly to prove that the intrusive legislation
was unnecessary and unwarranted. The appointment of the Breyer Commission
had not stopped the push for new legislation, but judicial leaders sought to
prove in other ways that new arrangements were unnecessary-that all con-
cerns could be addressed by improving existing arrangements.13 In September
20o6, the Judicial Conference adopted its previously promised policy on pri-
vately-funded seminars61 and a new policy on recusal for conflicts of interest."'
The same month, the Breyer Commission released its report, concluding that
chief circuit judges and judicial councils were competently handling the vast
majority of complaints filed under the 1980 Act, but that the "error rate" among
"high visibility cases" was "far too high."' 66 The Commission made a series of
U.S. 1146 (1995)). See Geyh, Constitutional Norms, supra note 14, at 209-1o; Ri-
chard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Wea-
pon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 256-72 (2007); Tuan Samahon, Impeachment
as Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 595, 605-12 (2010).
162. Since the Senate's refusal to remove Justice Chase after the House's impeachment,
the use of impeachment to retaliate against judges for particular decisions has
been viewed as improper. GEYH, COLLIDE, supra note 14, at 54, 142. Geyh con-
cludes that no judge need fear the threat of impeachment for a substantive deci-
sion. Id. at 170.
163. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 7, 19-20 (Mar. 13, 2007).
164. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 5, 11, 24 (Sept. 19, 20o6); Policy on Judges' Attendance at Privately Funded
Educational Programs, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/Seminar
Disclosure/judbrappc9o6c.pdf. The seminars policy details factors that judges
should consider in determining whether it is proper to attend a seminar. These
factors include the identity of the sponsor, the nature and source of the funding,
the likelihood of a sponsor or donor appearing before the judge, the subject mat-
ter of the program, and the nature of the reimbursed expenses. The policy also re-
quires advance disclosure by judges of attendance and by educational program
providers regarding topics, speakers, sponsors, and funding. See Comm. on Codes
of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 67: Attendance at Independent Educational Se-
minars, 2B GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 67-1 to 67-4 (2012), http://
www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Volo2B-Cho2.pdf.
165. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE POLICY ON JUDGES' ATTENDANCE AT PRIVATELY FUNDED
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS 1-2 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/SeminarDisclosure/judbrappc9o6c.pdf.
166. BREYER REPORT, supra note 152, at 5. The report found that five out of the seven-
teen high-profile cases it studied had been mishandled, generally because a chief
judge had failed to appoint a special committee to investigate a complaint, even
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recommendations, including that the Judicial Conference take on a "vigorous
consultative role" in reviewing circuit council orders to help chief judges deal
with difficult complaints.6 7 To implement the Commission's recommenda-
tions, the Judicial Conference directed its Committee on Judicial Conduct and
Disability to develop uniform mandatory procedural rules for the processing of
judicial misconduct complaints.'" One of the new rules authorized the Judicial
Conference to appoint a special committee to investigate a complaint even
where a chief judge and circuit council had declined to do so.' 9 This rule fur-
ther centralized judicial authority and bolstered the Judicial Conference's au-
thority.
Also in response to congressional criticism, the Judicial Conference di-
rected its Committee on Codes of Conduct to begin another full review and re-
vision of the Federal Code of Conduct. 70 It publicly explained that it was doing
so independent of the ABA's 2007 Model Code redrafting process-once again
distancing itself from the organized bar. 7 ' For the first time, the drafting com-
though the facts were "reasonably in dispute"-the statutory standard for ap-
pointing a special committee. Id. at 107-o8. Under the 1980 Act, a chief judge is
required to appoint a special committee unless the chief judge has determined ei-
ther that the complaint is frivolous, merit-based, or lacking any factual basis, or
that appropriate corrective action has been taken. 28 U.S.C. §§ 352, 353 (2012). See
also Hellman, Judges Judging Judges, supra note 14, at 431 ("A recurring theme in
the Breyer Committee's account of 'problematic' cases is the failure of a chief
judge 'to submit clear factual discrepancies to special committees for investiga-
tion."' (citation omitted)); Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics, supra note
14, at 241-42 ("If there is a single thread that runs through the various lapses chro-
nicled by the Committee and other observers, it is this: at each stage of the
process, the chief judge or circuit council opts for the action that is less structured
and less public.").
167. BREYER REPORT, supra note 152, at 107.
168. The intent was to eliminate procedural variation among circuits and to carve out
an expanded oversight function for the Conference. Press Release, Judicial Confe-
rence, National Rules Adopted for Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings
(Mar. 11, 20o8) (announcing the first set of nationally binding rules adopted by
the Judicial Conference dealing with accusations of misconduct by federal judges).
169. This rule was a response to a high-profile incident of misconduct by U.S. District
Judge Manuel Real that had revealed a problematic loophole in the existing rules.
See Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Fed-
eral Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 325,
331-32, 337, 339 (20o8).
170. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 9 (Sept., 16 2008); Request for Public Comment on Proposed Revisions to
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, THIRD BRANCH, March 2008, at 9. The
revised code was adopted by the Judicial Conference in 20o8. Judiciary Updates
Code of Conduct, Seeks New Judgeships, THIRD BRANCH, March 2009, at i.
171. See Lievense & Cohn, supra note 38, at 271 (emphasizing the independence of the
federal judiciary's drafting process).
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mittee requested public comment on a draft version of proposed changes.1'7 In
one of only a handful of submitted comments, the ABA repeated its suggestions
that the federal judiciary phrase its Code in mandatory terms and define mis-
conduct under the 1980 Act to include a violation of the Federal Code.'73 If it
did so, judicial councils and the Judicial Conference would retain significant
discretion in identifying violations of the Code and determining whether and
what sanctions were appropriate, but they would clarify to judges, lawyers, and
the public at large the meaning of the 1980 Act's vague description of sanctiona-
ble misconduct-"conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious adminis-
tration of the business of the courts." 7 4
. The drafting committee did not formally respond to the ABA's comments
(or to any of the submitted comments),"'7 and the Judicial Conference adopted
a revised Code that was stated in advisory terms. But the committee's chairman
later explained why the ABA's suggestions had been rejected: while the ABA's
approach turned the Model Code into a collection of "black and white" rules,
the Federal Code provided "guiding principles by which judges should ab-
ide."17
The rejection of the ABA's comments without formal explanation was re-
vealing. Although the Judicial Conference was willing to improve a number of
aspects of its judicial conduct arrangements to placate Congress, it was not will-
172. Public Comments Aid Study of Proposed Changes to Code of Conduct for Judges,
THIRD BRANCH, May 20o8, at 7 [hereinafter Public Comments Aid Study].
173. The ABA had restructured its 1990 Code to follow the example of the attorney
conduct rules. See Terry Carter, Keeping Up with the Times: New Conduct Code
May Require Judges To Report Impaired Colleagues, Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 67 (Apr.
2004) ("The Commission conducting the first sweeping review of the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct since 1990 is considering a new format that would help
judges understand more easily what conduct is prohibited. That structural change
would make the judicial canons more like the Model Rules.... 'That way there
would be a more obvious and clear distinction between the rules and comments,
with more of the aspirational content in the comments.... Then judges would
have a better idea about what would be the subject of enforcement."' (citation
omitted)).
174. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, § 3(c)(1) 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372
(2012)).
175. Public Comments Aid Study, supra note 172, at 7 (reporting receipt of comments
from the ABA, the American Judicature Society, the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, and Carl Bernofsky, a lawyer from Louisiana).
176. Gordon J. Quist, Giving Advice on Ethics: Seldom Simple, THIRD BRANCH, June
20o8, at io (elaborating that individual judges need sufficient discretion to tailor
their conduct to particular contexts, and disciplinary authorities need sufficient
discretion to consider the full range of relevant circumstances in reviewing com-
plaints).
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ing to sacrifice the discretion that had long been at the core of those arrange-
ments, nor did it appear interested in cultivating an ongoing dialogue with the
ABA.
1II. THE PATH AHEAD
Through the last three decades of the twentieth century, Congress and the
judiciary established a loose pattern of cooperation regarding matters of judicial
conduct regulation. When particular issues or problems of judicial conduct
provoked public attention, members of Congress threatened to intervene.
When the judiciary took action to address the problem itself-in the early years,
with help from the bar-Congress stepped aside.
Events in the early 2000S marked a shift in this traditional pattern and the
disappearance of any signs of cooperation. With the bar formally excluded from
the process, both Congress and the Judicial Conference assumed increasingly
polarized positions. Congress pushed ahead with unconstitutional legislation
while the judiciary defended the status quo. The inadequacy of both positions
provides a window into the inability of any one of these institutions, acting
alone, to address judicial conduct regulation effectively. All three institutions-
bench, bar, and Congress-need to participate in a system of tripartite checks
and balances.
A. Turning Point
When congressional leaders introduced the 20o6 inspector general legisla-
tion, they faced a judiciary that was staking out an extreme position on judicial
autonomy and that had failed to act on the controversial issue of judicial atten-
dance at privately funded seminars. After promising to act promptly, the Judi-
cial Conference had delayed action for six years. Congress responded by doing
what it had always done when it identified important problems in the conduct
system: it threatened legislation. Previously, however, Congress had threatened
legislation that would have increased the individual accountability of judges. In
2006, facing a judiciary that was unwilling to act, Congress threatened legisla-
tion that would have increased the institutional accountability of the judiciary
as a whole. Taking a more adversarial stance, Congress threatened inspector
general legislation that would have fundamentally undermined judicial self-
regulation and re-shaped interbranch relations.
Members of Congress have frequently used conduct regulation in a politi-
cal, and often partisan, manner. As noted, they have periodically advocated the
impeachment of particular judges and justices because of particular substantive
rulings. But in the past, these calls served primarily as a signaling device for the
benefit of constituents.'" They did not pose credible threats to judges' or justic-
es' tenure or to the judiciary's self-regulatory authority.
177. See, e.g., Mike Allen, DeLay Apologizes for Comments: Leader Wouldn't Say Wheth-
er He Wants Schiavo Judges Impeached, WASH. PosT, Apr. 14, 2005, at AS; Robert
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Against this background, the inspector general bill marks a significant and
troubling turning point in Congress's approach to conduct regulation. The bill
proposes to strip the judiciary of a measure of institutional autonomy and to
make judicial administration and decisionmaking susceptible to Congress's po-
litical preferences."' The bill brings institutional politics to the forefront of the
debate and threatens to bring partisan politics into the structure of conduct
regulation.
When the Judicial Conference recognized a new intensity in congressional
calls for action in 2005 and 2006, it retreated from its stance of extreme auton-
omy and did what it had successfully done in the past. It responded to congres-
sional criticism with concerted efforts to improve its existing scheme of self-
regulation."'7 But its efforts were inapposite to the shift in Congress's approach
and came too late to reestablish good faith interbranch relations. These efforts
failed to appease congressional leaders, who continued to advocate inspector
general legislation. Between 20o6 and 2011, the bill was introduced four times in
both houses."so The bill has failed to garner significant political support thus far,
but may become politically viable if the Judicial Conference fails to respond
with significant changes to the current system. Moreover, it is symbolically sig-
nificant in marking a turn away from the historical pattern of interactions be-
tween Congress and the judiciary and toward increasing hostility.
The resulting interbranch impasse demonstrates deep structural imbalances
in judicial conduct regulation. Although the judiciary has long used conduct
regulation to solidify its institutional position, it has always acted in the shadow
of potential congressional interference, which functions as an institutional ac-
countability mechanism. By either threatening or enacting legislation, Congress
has always been able to check self-interested behavior by the judiciary. Except
for judicial review, there is no corresponding mechanism for the judiciary to
check self-interested behavior by Congress.
In 20o6, the judiciary was able to take steps to reduce congressional pres-
sure and preempt congressional action. Now, in contrast, the judiciary has far
less ground to give in terms of meaningful concessions and no means of resist-
Barnes, In Emotionally Charged Times, Calls Arise for Impeachment of a Justice or
Two, WASH. PosT, Nov. 1, 201o, at A19; Amy Gardner & Matt DeLong, Newt Gin-
grich's Assault on 'Activist Judges' Draws Criticism, Even from Right, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/newt-gingrichs-assault
-on-activist-judges-draws-criticism-even-from-right/2011/12/17/gIQAoYa800
_story.html.
178. Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Inter-
branch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 909, 910, 913-14 (2006) (noting efforts by Con-
gress in other contexts "to persuade the public that courts are part of ordinary
politics and thus that judges are policy agents to be held accountable as such").
179. See supra notes 163-172 and accompanying text.
18o. H.R. 727, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 348, 112th Cong. (2on); H.R. 486, nith Cong.
(2009); S. 220, iiith Cong. (2009); H.R. 785, ioth Cong. (2007); S. 461, iioth
Cong. (2007); H.R. 5219, lo9th Cong. (20o6); S. 2678, 1o9th Cong. (20o6).
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ing congressional self-interest. But there is no less pressure from Congress, and
its options for action are limited. It could simply not act or it could actively dis-
obey Congress, but both paths would undermine the judiciary's legitimacy
while making congressional interference more likely. If Congress enacts the in-
spector general legislation, courts could invalidate it as an impermissible usur-
pation of judicial independence. But doing so could undermine the judiciary's
legitimacy by revealing the lengths to which federal judges would go to avoid
outside scrutiny and regulation. This, in turn, could risk a true constitutional
crisis.
Consequently, the current impasse between Congress and the judiciary dif-
fers in significant respects from previous phases of reform. Until recent years,
Congress used the threat of legislation to ensure that the Judicial Conference
acted to address conduct problems. But as long as the Judicial Conference did
so, Congress deferred to the judiciary's choices regarding how it would do so.
Members of Congress are no longer satisfied with this arrangement. They have
started using conduct regulation as a powerful tool to increase the institutional
accountability of the judiciary to their political preferences, and as a means
through which to intervene in judicial self-regulation. The judiciary, mean-
while, has limited options for quieting congressional criticism.
B. Evaluating the Inspector General Legislation
Institutional accountability is an important part of the judicial indepen-
dence balance."' The inspector general legislation, however, imposes a proble-
matic form of accountability.' As discussed above, inspector general investiga-
tions could be used to retaliate against particular judges for their substantive
decisions and could undermine the branch's ability to safeguard judges' inde-
pendence.' As drafted, the inspector general legislation may even be unconsti-
181. Burbank, supra note 17, at 339.
182. See, e.g., RECOMMENDATION ADOPTED BY THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES No.
308, at 11-12 (Aug. 7-8, 20o6), http://www.aba.org/leardership/2oo6/annual
/dailyjournal/threehunderedeight.doc [hereinafter ABA RECOMMENDATION No.
308] ("[O]ur opposition is not premised on the assertion that enactment of this
legislation would in fact constitute a violation of the separation-of-powers doc-
trine if it were challenged in court Even if it were constitutionally permissible for
Congress to establish an IG under this bill, we still would object to it on policy
grounds and because it threatens separation of powers by altering the well-
balanced calibration in our system of checks and balances." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
183. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2oo6: Hearing on H.R. 5219
Before the Subcomm. on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 39 (20o6) (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Professor
of Law, Indiana University).
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tutional. 8 4 However, the text of the Constitution almost certainly creates space
for increased congressional involvement in judicial conduct regulation. Accor-
dingly, even if the current bills go too far, Congress could enact more moderate
but still intrusive legislation to hold the judiciary institutionally accountable.
For example, Congress could codify particular standards of conduct and partic-
ular procedures for processing complaints."'
As many commentators have noted, the text of Article III provides limited
safeguards of judicial independence.'" Vesting the judicial power in the Su-
preme Court and such lower courts as Congress creates, Article III grants judges
life tenure during "good Behaviour" and ensures them compensation that can-
not be diminished.8 7 Significantly, Article III's standard of "good Behaviour"
differs from Article II's standard for impeachment: "Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."" For this reason, commentators have argued
that the standard for impeachment of Article III judges is lower than that for
impeachment of other "civil Officials of the United States.""9 Certainly, the dif-
ferent standards suggest that Congress could regulate judicial conduct in the
gap between good behavior and impeachable conduct.'"0
Over time and as a product of custom, Congress has developed heightened
protections of judicial independence."' In exploring customs of judicial inde-
184. See, e.g., Donald E. Campbell, Should the Rooster Guard the Henhouse: Evaluating
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 Miss. C. L. REV. 381, 404 (2009).
185. For example, members of Congress recently introduced bills that would have im-
posed a code of conduct on Supreme Court Justices. H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2001).
A group of over one hundred law professors wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee advocating the constitutionality and desirability of such legislation.
Letter from Mark N. Aaronson, Professor of Law, Univ. of California Hastings
College of Law, et al., to Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of Senate Ju-
diciary Comm. and House Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://
www.afj.org/judicial-ethics sign on_1etter.pdf; see R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask
Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court, WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2on/o2/23/AR2onO223o
4975.html. Because the Judicial Conference lacks jurisdiction over the Supreme
Court, these proposals are outside the scope of this Article. However, they provide
a window onto the types of legislation that Congress could pursue.
186. Geyh, Constitutional Norms, supra note 14, at 161.
187. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
188. Id. art. II, § 4.
189. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 161, at 173-74; Samahon, supra note 161, at 625-26.
190. See Neumann, supra note 161, at 173.
191. Congress has rejected, for example, the use of impeachment, jurisdiction-
stripping, and court-packing for the purposes of holding judges accountable for
their decisions. These congressional practices express "customary judicial inde-
pendence," which is rooted not in the text of the Constitution but rather in the
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pendence, Charles Geyh has noted that any decisions by Congress to "overlook
or override its customs or precedents .. . must first overcome the presumption
that such action is contrary to the Constitution as Congress has traditionally
construed it."' 92 In recent years, however, many members of Congress have ap-
peared ready to reject long-standing customs of judicial independence. For ex-
ample, members of Congress have politicized the appointments process even
though that politicization undermines constitutional norms of judicial inde-
pendence.'93
Against this backdrop, judicial conduct regulation provides fertile ground
for increased congressional involvement in judicial affairs. By virtue of its au-
thority to constitute the lower federal courts and to make laws necessary and
proper for empowering the judiciary to decide cases and controversies,'194 Con-
gress has long played a significant role in designing and regulating matters of
judicial administration and procedure, including those relating to judicial con-
duct.' 5 Indeed, court administration has long been viewed as a power shared
between Congress and the judiciary."96 Having long acquiesced in this arrange-
ment with respect to rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act and with respect
to conduct regulation under the 1980 Act, the judiciary would be hard pressed
to claim now that judicial administration generally or conduct regulation spe-
cifically is part of the Judicial Power, invested exclusively in the federal judi-
ciary.
The inspector general legislation may go too far, but Congress could likely
play a much more intrusive role in judicial conduct regulation than it currently
plays without exceeding the bounds of its constitutional role. That an increased
role is constitutionally permissible does not mean that it is normatively desira-
ble, however. To the contrary, judicial legitimacy and independence would be
bolstered if the judiciary acted for itself so that pressure for an increased con-
gressional role dissipated.
historical practices of Congress. Geyh, Constitutional Norms, supra note 14, at 158,
221.
192. Id. at 166.
193. Id. at 159, 220 ("The appointments process, by virtue of its unique interbranch
dynamic, and the relative ease with which ideologically motivated rejections can
be accomplished, has evolved separately, unencumbered by the same judicial in-
dependence norms, and has thus become the last best hope for legislators seeking
to preserve some measure of extrajudicial accountability.").
194. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1-2.
195. See, e.g., Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham: Rules Changes Under Review, THIRD
BRANCH, Feb. 1995, at lo, 11.
196. Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point, supra note 14, at 1052.
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C. Assessing Judicial Legitimacy
Adding to the judiciary's current predicament, its conduct regulation ar-
rangements are currently attracting significant public criticism and distrust.
Part of the problem stems from the self-regulatory nature of these arrange-
ments. Any self-regulatory system is vulnerable to pathologies of self-interest.
The dangers may be exacerbated in the context of the federal judiciary.'97 Feder-
al judges are undoubtedly committed to the integrity and legitimacy of the fed-
eral courts, but the judiciary is an exceptionally insular institution. Appointed
for life and protected against reductions in salary, federal judges are prone to
view the world from a different perspective than members of the public-a
perspective that may be far more forgiving of colleagues' questionable conduct
than would appear appropriate to a member of the public. In addition, judges
have been socialized to place a high value on judicial collegiality, expertise, and
discretion. 98 Both judges and other commentators have noted judges' tenden-
cies to trust their colleagues and to want to protect judges and courts from un-
due criticism or publicity.'99 For example, the Breyer Commission observed that
a common theme among cases of mishandled complaints was the chief judge's
failure to appoint a special committee to conduct the investigation.2 oo This fail-
ure may be explained by an effort to avoid problematic publicity for the judge
in question, the judge's home circuit, or the judiciary.
In one particularly problematic case that the Breyer Commission analyzed,
a chief judge improperly dismissed a complaint twice, and the dismissal was af-
firmed by the circuit council on the basis that "adequate corrective action ha[d]
been taken."2 o' A divided panel of the Judicial Conference's Committee on
Conduct and Disability then dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction to re-
view a case for which the complaint had been dismissed by the chief judge.202
Dissenting, Judge Winter recognized the ramifications of this decision for pub-
lic confidence in judicial self-regulation:
The judicial misconduct procedure is a self-regulatory one. It is self-
regulatory at the request of the judiciary in a legitimate effort to pre-
serve judicial independence. A self-regulatory procedure suffers from
197. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 14, at 443 n.20.
198. Robert Carp & Russell Wheeler, Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a Federal Dis-
trict Judge, 21 J. PUB. L. 359, 389-90 (1972).
199. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 14, at 442.
200. BREYER REPORT, supra note 152, at 200 (noting that a recurring theme among
problematic cases was the failure of a chief judge "to submit clear factual discre-
pancies to special committees for investigation").
201. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (9th Cir. Jud. Coun-
cil 2005).
202. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. To Review Circuit Council Conduct
and Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 1o9 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006).
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the weakness that many observers will be suspicious that complainants
against judges will be disfavored. The Committee's decision in this case
can only fuel such suspicions.o 3
Notwithstanding the Judicial Conference's efforts to respond to problems
identified by the Breyer Report, public perceptions have worsened in recent
years. Between 20o8 and 2010, egregious misconduct led to the impeachment or
resignation of three federal judges.20 Congressional leaders have cited these in-
cidents in building support for inspector general legislation. In each case, the
judiciary's discipline system, functioning properly, brought the problems to
light and laid the groundwork for removal. There is no evidence that these inci-
dents are representative of wider patterns of misconduct. However, the public
has few points of contact with, or sources of information regarding, the inner
workings of the federal judiciary. Because of widespread media coverage and
congressional attention, these high-profile incidents have eroded public trust in
the judiciary as an institution.
D. Proposals for Reform
The judiciary and Congress are both responsible for the current impasse re-
garding judicial conduct regulation, but the judiciary has far more to lose.
Structural imbalances in interbranch relations limit the judiciary's ability to
check self-interested congressional action while declining public confidence is
undermining its independence. If the judiciary fails to take action and pushes
the current standoff too far, Congress may withdraw the judiciary's power to
self-regulate, fundamentally undermining judicial independence and triggering
203. Id. at 117 (Winter, J., dissenting).
204. In October 20o8, Chief Judge Nottingham of the District of Colorado resigned in
the face of multiple complaints that, among other things, he lied under investiga-
tion, hired prostitutes, was frequently intoxicated in public, and violated court
policy by viewing pornography on his court computer. District Judge Nottingham
Resigns, Apologizes, DENV. POST, Dec. 2, 20o8, http://www.denverpost.com
/news/ci10777031; see In re Nottingham, Complaint Nos. 2007-10-372-36,
2007-10-372-45, 10-o8-90089, 10-08-90090 (order dismissing complaints at 1-2)
(loth Cir. Oct. 30, 2008), http://howappealing.law.com/EWN final order.pdf. In
May 2009, District Judge Samuel Kent pled guilty to obstruction of justice for ly-
ing in an investigation regarding sexual abuse and misconduct. He was sentenced
to thirty-three months in prison. After the House Judiciary Committee voted to
impeach him, he resigned. See Brenda Sapino Jefferys, Former Judge Samuel B.
Kent Sentenced to 33 Months in Prison, TEX. LAw., May 11, 2009; see also Martha
Neil, Federal Judge Samuel Kent Resigns, as Senate Impeachment Trial Looms,
A.B.A. J. (June 25, 2009), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal
judgesamuel-kentjresigns assenateimpeachment triallooms. In October
20o, District Judge Thomas Porteous was impeached and convicted by the Senate
for lying under oath, filing a bankruptcy petition under a false name, hiding assets
and gambling debts, and soliciting and accepting cash and other gifts from liti-
gants and lawyers. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-427 (2009).
72
31 : 33 2012
THE INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONDUCT REGULATION
a constitutional crisis between branches. Fortunately, the history of judicial
conduct regulation offers guidance for the path ahead. The judiciary can pre-
serve its independence by eliminating its existing vulnerability to criticism and
by weakening congressional momentum for reform. To do so, it should reenlist
the support of the organized bar and institute a more participatory and transpa-
rent conduct regulation process.
i. Renewed Alliance with the Bar
In the early years of reform, alliance with the organized legal profession was
politically convenient for the judiciary and provided resources for improving
conduct regulation reform.20 Since the 198os, however, the Judicial Conference
has taken the profession for granted-openly dismissing a role for bar input206
while continuing to rely on bar support when Congress threatens to erode judi-
cial independence.
Elsewhere I have described the dangers of excessive ABA influence in the
states.2 0 7 As the Judicial Conference's exclusion of the bar from conduct regula-
205. See supra Section I.B.
206. The chair of the Codes of Conduct Committee, in describing the recent Federal
Code revision, described the Model Code as having limited relevance to the feder-
al drafting process. See Lievense & Cohn, supra note 38, at 271. The truth of this
statement was illustrated by the continuing divergence of the Federal Code and
the ABA's Model Code. Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon
(D)(5) & cmt. (encouraging judges to participate in all types of nonprofit organi-
zations, prohibiting direct fundraising for any of them, and treating them all simi-
larly for purposes of compensation, reimbursement, and financial reporting), with
ABA Model Code Reporter's Explanation, R. 3-7, 3.13, at 42-43, 50 (2007) (explain-
ing that "[t]his distinction between events and organizations that are or are not
law-related is another theme that occurs throughout Canon 3"); compare ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, pt C. § 620.35(b)(3)
(prohibiting any judicial officer or employee from accepting gifts from anyone
appearing before the court, including all lawyers), with Reporter's Explanation, R.
3.13(C)(3), 50 (2007) (viewing a previous ban on gifts and substantial invitations
from lawyers appearing before a judge as "more stringent than necessary" and
therefore allowing such gifts and invitations if reported), and MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.13(B) (2007), and MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4D(5)(h) (1990) (granting a judge virtually unrestricted discretion to re-
ceive gifts and invitations from lawyers who do not appear before the judge).
These and other differences may appear minor, but they reflect the diminished in-
fluence of the ABA and they allow for significantly less informal access by lawyers
to judges. See Remus, supra note 15, at 139-42.
207. Remus, supra note 15, at 143-55. The ABA's self-interest in state judicial conduct
regulation remains largely unchecked by state legislatures or judiciaries. This is
not a problem in the federal system, where the ABA's interests have been checked
by the existing engagement of the Judicial Conference and Congress, and by
greater visibility. The ABA has therefore taken more responsible and publicly
oriented positions in the federal system than in the states. For example, it advo-
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tion arrangements shows, however, complete exclusion of the ABA can be
equally problematic. The ABA's inclusion is important because the ABA can ef-
fectively check the interests of both Congress and the judiciary and can diffuse
the current impasse between the two.
The bar is well-positioned to advocate limits on both the judiciary's exer-
cise of its self-regulatory powers and Congress's attempts to encroach on judi-
cial independence.20s The bar is well versed in the court system. It is familiar
with the interests of key stakeholders in the court system-litigants and law-
yers-whose input is critical to the efficacy and legitimacy of judicial conduct
regulation.2 09 And notwithstanding its formal exclusion from the federal con-
duct regulation process, the ABA has continued to devote significant material
resources to the study of existing arrangements and the formulation of propos-
als for change.
In other contexts, the ABA has been appropriately criticized for being in-
sufficiently representative of the profession and for acting in a partisan man-
ner.2 10 In the context of judicial conduct regulation, however, the profession's
interests are remarkably unified. The ABA has refrained from taking partisan
positions and through fifty years of change in the composition of the federal
cated a strict seminar attendance policy in the federal system, which would have
prohibited attendance at virtually all privately funded seminars. In the states, it
advocated a far more permissive policy, which left the decision to the discretion of
judges and required limited disclosure. Id. While the drafters of the Model Code
enabled state judiciaries and the bar to draw closer together through provisions
encouraging frequent and informal bench-bar interactions, the federal drafters in-
troduced new restrictions on interactions between judges and lawyers, building
increased distance into the relationship between the federal judiciary and the bar.
Id. Accordingly, in some respects, the Federal Code's divergence from the ABA
Model Code is desirable. For example, the Federal Code's prohibition on judicial
participation in any form of fundraising activities is far preferable to the Model
Code's exceptions for bar-related activities, which appear self-interested. Id. at
142-43.
208. Cf Carrington & Cramton, supra note 14, at iio8 (seeking to define a role for "citi-
zen lawyers" in ensuring effective judicial accountability and independence).
209. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 380 (2004); Mark Seiden-
feld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 421-22 (2000).
210. The practice of law is subject to great variation by practice area and location, and
the ABA has been widely criticized for failing to capture that variation. See JOHN
P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 3 (1982). The ABA has also been widely criticized for taking partisan
positions on issues such as abortion, the death penalty, gay marriage, and even in
its evaluation of judicial nominees. See, e.g., Richard L. Vining, Amy Steigerwalt &
Susan Navarro Smeicer, Bias and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal
Judicial Nominees (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 1,368,891, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368891.
74
31 : 33 2012
THE INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONDUCT REGULATION
courts, the ABA has consistently demonstrated sensitivity to the distinction be-
tween measures that would improve judicial accountability and measures that
would harm judicial independence."'
Moreover, the ABA has appeared to prioritize its civic interests over its pri-
vate interests when addressing conduct regulation in the federal system. The
ABA has engaged in sustained efforts to support and bolster judicial indepen-
dence in the federal system, even in the absence of formal recognition by the
federal judiciary and with little potential gain for itself or its members. This
suggests that the ABA would not leverage a role in federal judicial conduct ar-
rangements to promote problematic ties between the legal profession and the
federal judiciary, as it has done in the states. Bar interests would be checked by
the interests of Congress and the judiciary, and by the greater visibility of the
federal system. The bar, in turn, could check the interests of both Congress and
the judiciary.
2. Increased Participation and Transparency
As several commentators have observed, the insularity and secrecy of the
judiciary's current conduct regulation system have given rise to problematic
appearances. A significant step in bolstering the judiciary's current position
would therefore be to implement a more participatory and transparent conduct
regulation process. Doing so would increase judicial accountability in a way that
increases public confidence and bolsters judicial independence.
Currently, the Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct is
comprised exclusively of federal judges, and its proceedings are largely closed
211. The ABA has consistently proposed and supported judicial accountability and le-
gitimacy measures that would increase efficacy in conduct regulation without in-
fringing upon decisional independence, while consistently opposing measures
that would erode the judiciary's institutional independence from Congress. For
example, the ABA partnered with the Judicial Conference in the late 1960s to draft
what would become the first Federal Code of Conduct, improving conduct regu-
lation arrangements while preempting congressional interference. Although the
ABA split with the judiciary in forwarding removal legislation through the 1970s,
the ABA's proposals would have vested control over removal with the judiciary it-
self, arguably bolstering judicial autonomy. More recently, the ABA has been out-
spoken in opposing inspector general legislation, which it characterizes as an in-
fringement on judicial decisional independence. ABA RECOMMENDATION NO. 308,
supra note 182 (opposing any such legislation that requires the Chief Justice to
consult with congressional leaders over the appointment of an Inspector General,
confers on the Inspector General broad subpoena powers, or requires the Inspec-
tor General to report to Congress). The ABA has publicly applauded actions by
the Judicial Conference to address particular problems by implementing auto-
mated conflicts checking software and a new policy on private seminar atten-
dance. See id. (applauding the Judicial Conference's actions in response to con-
gressional concerns and advocating increased informal interbranch
communications and exchanges).
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from view.2 12 To increase participation and transparency, membership of the
Committee should be broadened to include representatives from the public, the
organized bar, and the academy. To ensure their independence and ability to
counter judicial perspectives, these individuals should be designated by the
groups they represent rather than being chosen by judicial leaders. Even if the
views of nonjudicial members are ultimately rejected, deliberation and discus-
sion would serve as an important check on abuses of judicial discretion. 13 In
addition, the Committee should solicit feedback through public meetings and
formal notice and comment periods, and it should offer reasoned public res-
ponses.
For many of these changes, the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure and advisory rulemaking committees offer useful
guidance. The rulemaking committees include representatives from a variety of
groups-federal judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, state chief justices,
and representatives of the Department of Justice.2 14 Their processes entail sus-
tained deliberations and multiple efforts at transparency, including public
meetings, detailed public committee records, public notice-and-comment pe-
riods, and reasoned responses."' Though not analogous in all respects, they of-
fer useful examples of ways in which the Judicial Conference could implement a
more collaborative process.
The Judicial Conference should also address the appearance of impropriety
by limiting the extent of judicial discretion built into the current system, both
in the definition of misconduct and in the imposition of sanctions."' The po-
tential for abuse has been noted by commentators and by the ABA,2 17 but lead-
212. Although the committee invited public comments on a draft for the first time in
2007, it provided no public responses. See Request for Public Comment on Proposed
Revisions to Code of Conduct for United States Judges, supra note 170, at 9.
213. Cf. Lobel, supra note 209, at 380.
214. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure,
A Summary for Bench and Bar (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/federalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx.
215. See Cary Coliganese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924,
927-28 (2009) (discussing the instrumental value of transparency in government
processes for facilitating meaningful public participation). One consistent criti-
cism of the rulemaking process, of which designers of the conduct drafting
process should remain aware, is that it favors some segments of the profession by
excluding participation by other segments. This risk could be addressed through
efforts to solicit comments from a variety of specialty bar associations and diverse
segments of the profession.
216. See, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, supra note 14, at 1137-4o; Rotunda, supra note 14,
at 309.
217. See generally Bazelon, supra note 14 (detailing the amount of discretion afforded
to judges in the judiciary's disciplinary system).
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ers within the judiciary have been unresponsive to calls for change. When asked
if the Federal Code is "simply advisory in nature for federal judges," the chair of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct replied: "I wish you
hadn't used the word 'simply.' Essentially, yes.""
To signal a commitment to enforceable standards of conduct, the Judicial
Conference should accept the ABA's repeated suggestions to articulate code
provisions in mandatory rather than advisory terms and to define misconduct
under the 1980 Act by reference to the Federal Code." 9 Given that the enforce-
ment power will remain within the judiciary, this change will not sacrifice au-
tonomy to Congress. It will, however, bolster legitimacy and improve institu-
tional accountability. It will also constitute an important concession to the bar,
signaling a willingness to work together on issues of conduct regulation.
Finally, the Judicial Conference could also reduce the extreme discretion
inherent in current arrangements by defining misconduct to include a knowing
failure to follow the procedures of the 1980 Act and the Judicial Conference's
implementing regulations. Based on the findings of the Breyer Commission and
in an effort to address observed failures of chief judges and circuit councils to
follow complaint procedures,2 2 0 the Judicial Conference issued uniform imple-
menting guidelines to be adopted in all circuits.2 ' The frequency of these fail-
ures would be reduced, and institutional accountability increased, if intentional
failure to follow the procedural rules were a form of misconduct subject to dis-
cipline. Already, the Judicial Conference has created a mechanism for review of
a chief judge's failure to appoint a special committee. But the need for review
would be lessened if the consequences of a mistaken dismissal were not only re-
versal of the decision but a potential misconduct complaint.
The Judicial Conference can increase the efficacy and legitimacy of its con-
duct regulation arrangements by including and transparently balancing the in-
terests of Congress, the judiciary, and the organized legal profession. By lessen-
ing the discretion at the core of these arrangements, the Conference can bolster
218. Gordon J. Quist, Giving Advice on Ethics is Seldom Simple, THIRD BRANCH, June
2008, at lo.
219. Impeaching Manuel L. Real, A Judge of the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing on H.R. 916
Before the Subomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. (2006) (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Pro-
fessor of Law, Indiana University).
220. BREYER REPORT, supra note 152, at 107. One of the most frequent problems was
failure by a chief judge to appoint a special committee.
221. RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 9, R. I cmt. ("Based on the findings of
the Breyer Committee, the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct
and Disability concluded that there was a need for the Judicial Conference to ex-
ercise its power under Section 358 of the Act to fashion standards guiding the var-
ious officers and bodies who must exercise responsibility under the Act. To that
end, the Judicial Conference Committee proposed rules that were based largely on
Appendix E of the Breyer Committee Report and the Illustrative Rules.").
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public trust and confidence. These changes could reduce the incentives for
members of Congress to pursue interventionist legislation. These changes could
also draw attention away from institutional politics and back towards the effica-
cy of conduct regulation arrangements.
CONCLUSION
Federal judicial conduct regulation has been, and is, about much more than
simply ensuring that judges conduct themselves appropriately. The conduct
reform movement began as a political crisis for the judiciary, threatening its au-
tonomy from both Congress and the legal profession. The Judicial Conference
then used conduct regulation strategically to expand the judiciary's institutional
autonomy and to develop its institutional identity. When understood in con-
text, judicial conduct regulation has lain at the heart of the institutional devel-
opment of the judiciary. In less than fifty years, conduct regulation permitted
the Judicial Conference to solidify its authority over individual federal judges,
quieting internal dissent, to speak to Congress with a unified voice, and to de-
velop as a profession separate from the legal profession.
Recently, high-profile misconduct has eroded judicial legitimacy and fueled
new calls for reform, just as it did at previous points in the reform process.
Now, however, Congress is attempting to use the political moment to bring the
judiciary in line with the political preferences of Congress, bringing institution-
al politics to the forefront and further eroding judicial legitimacy in the process.
To counter this new and potentially dangerous approach by Congress, the
judiciary should bolster its legitimacy by improving aspects of the conduct
regulation system. Through a more transparent and participatory process, judi-
cial conduct regulation can move from a point of conflict to a site of collabora-
tion.
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